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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The basic principle of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment is that the phrase “cruel and unusual” must 
draw its meaning from “the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”1 To implement this principle, the 
Court has considered whether “objective indicia” of prevailing com-
munity norms—such as the number of states that impose the pun-
																																																																																																																																	
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I wish to 
thank Laura Appleman, Shima Baradaram, Mary Berkheiser, Jennifer Chacón, Bernard 
Chao, Alan Chen, Jack Chin, Carissa Hessick, Elizabeth Jones, Sam Kamin, Jennifer Lee 
Koh, Arnold Loewy, Justin Marceau, Fatma Marouf, Tom McAffee, Garrick Pursley, Addie 
Rolnick, David Tanenhaus, Anne Traum, and Hannah Wiseman for their very helpful 
comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Amanda Walck for her excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that punishing a deserter by tak-
ing away citizenship is unconstitutional). 
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ishment—support the finding of a national consensus against the 
punishment being challenged.2 
 The Court’s reliance on objective indicia has been subjected to sus-
tained scholarly criticism. While largely persuasive, the conventional 
critique has several shortcomings, the most significant of which is 
the failure of other scholars to provide a viable alternative to the 
Court’s objective indicia approach. In this Article, I propose a novel 
alternative methodology based on a version of strict scrutiny for sus-
pect classes of punishments, offenses, and offenders. This proposal is 
timely because the Supreme Court recently indicated for the first 
time, in Miller v. Alabama,3 that it is poised to abandon the objective 
indicia approach. Miller does not provide a comprehensive replace-
ment approach, however, leaving a methodological vacuum to be 
filled. The strict scrutiny approach provides a framework to flesh out 
the Court’s new attitude at a time when there is a rare opportunity to 
influence the Court’s constitutional decisionmaking. 
 The Eighth Amendment form of strict scrutiny approach draws on 
the insight that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the “evolving 
standards” approach neither requires recourse to objective indicia nor 
is unique to the Eighth Amendment. Interpretation of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause is not as exceptional as most courts and 
commentators would have us believe. Properly understood, the de-
mand that cruel and unusual must be understood through the lens of 
“evolving standards of decency” is nothing more than a repudiation of 
a narrow version of originalism. This disavowal of “original expected 
application”4 is, of course, not limited to the Eighth Amendment. And 
outside the Eighth Amendment context, recourse to objective indicia 
is the exception rather than the rule; contemporary understandings 
of the Constitution’s terms are ascertained and applied without ref-
erence to the purportedly objective criteria upon which the Court has 
relied when applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 
The Equal Protection Clause is a useful example. Living constitu-
tionalists insist that the Clause should be understood through a con-
temporary rather than historical lens—in other words, that it should 
be read in light of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”5 But these same living constitution-
																																																																																																																																	
 2. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010). 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 4. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011) (“Original expected application 
asks how people living at the time the text was adopted would have expected it would be 
applied using language in its ordinary sense (along with any legal terms of art). Thus, the 
original expected application includes not only specific results, but also the way that the 
adopting generation would have expected the relevant constitutional principles to be artic-
ulated and applied.”). 
 5. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.  More specifically, living constitutionalism, also referred to 
as non-originalism, “is the thesis that facts that occur after ratification or amendment can 
properly bear—constitutively, not just evidentially—on how courts should interpret the 
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alists would surely balk at the suggestion that a prohibition on inter-
racial marriage, for instance, only violates the Equal Protection 
Clause if a sufficient number of states allow interracial marriage. 
Nor does the Court feel the need to justify its Equal Protection 
Clause decisions by reference to objective indicia. Instead, the Court 
reflects contemporary appreciation for the invidiousness of racial dis-
tinctions by applying “the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ ”6 to cases involving 
suspect classifications such as race,7 while applying a lower level of 
scrutiny to cases that do not involve suspect classifications. 
 I suggest an analogous—but, I stress, not identical—approach to 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. I agree that the Clause 
should be understood in light of society’s evolving standards, but I 
reject the notion that evolving standards can only be ascertained by 
analyzing the Court’s objective indicia. The Eighth Amendment’s core 
concept is that punishment not be excessive—that it be proportional 
to the punishment for which it is imposed.8 That is, punishment must 
not be more severe than is necessary to achieve the legitimate goals 
of punishment. Our understanding of these legitimate goals (such as 
retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence), and of what is appropri-
ate to achieving these goals, has evolved since the Eighth Amend-
ment was first adopted. The Court can adhere to the evolving stand-
ards interpretive principle, then, by applying our current under-
standings of legitimate penological goals rather than the eighteenth 
century understanding of appropriate punishment. Similarly, socie-
ty’s understanding of the capacity, both mental and moral, of indi-
viduals with certain characteristics—for example, juveniles and the 
mentally retarded—have evolved substantially. By taking into ac-
count these modern (and widely accepted) understandings, the Court 
is able to interpret and apply the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause in light of society’s evolving standards of decency—without 
having to rely on purportedly objective indicia in the form of legisla-
tive enactments, jury decisions, and so forth. 
 The difficulty with applying the excessiveness principle is in cali-
brating the precise level of punishment required (or allowed) by the 
justifications of punishment. There is room for reasonable people to 
reasonably disagree, not just about which goals of punishment are 
legitimate but also about the severity of punishment required for a 
particular offense or offender. The scope for such reasonable disa-
greement raises the specter that the Supreme Court Justices, free 
from the constraints that the original meaning of the Clause would 
																																																																																																																																	
Constitution (even when the original meaning is sufficiently clear).” Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009). 
 6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
 7. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 8. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)). 
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provide, may impose their individual moral views under the guise of 
society’s evolved standards. The Court’s objective indicia approach is 
posited as the only way to avoid this problem.  
 But the Court’s treatment of other sections of the Constitution, 
including the Equal Protection Clause, shows that the choice between 
raw judicial fiat and quantifiable external data is a false dilemma. 
There are other doctrinal mechanisms available for deciding cases in 
which neither side can marshal a knockout argument. One such 
mechanism is to impose different standards of review, and to shift 
the burden of persuasion, depending on whether we have reason to 
be suspicious of legislative action. In the Equal Protection Clause 
context, we are suspicious of—and strictly scrutinize—legislative dis-
tinctions based on race. (Legislative distinctions involve an implicit 
claim by the legislature that the distinctions achieve some legitimate 
government purpose; when the distinction is based on race, we are 
skeptical of this implicit claim.) In this Article, I argue that in the 
Eighth Amendment context, we should suspect—and more strictly 
scrutinize—the authorization of extreme punishments for certain 
classes of offenses and offenders, classes that we generally (and non-
controversially) accept involve lower than usual moral culpability. 
Legislative authorization of a particular punishment to a set of of-
fenses or offenders involves the implicit claim that the punishment is 
proportional to those offenses, and for those offenders. My claim is 
that we have reason to be skeptical of this implicit claim when an 
extreme punishment—such as the death penalty or life without pa-
role, which are understood as only being proportional to the “worst of 
the worst”—is authorized for a class of offenders or offenses that, as a 
general rule, we recognized as having lessened culpability. 
 For example, few would argue that the mentally retarded, as a 
class, and juveniles, as a class, have equivalent mental and moral 
capacity to that of fully competent adults. They therefore have less 
moral culpability for the offenses they commit, and less ability to con-
form their actions to the dictates of reason. Consequently, the dis-
tinctive attributes of mentally retarded and juvenile offenders “di-
minish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sen-
tences”9 on offenders in those categories. There is therefore a great 
risk that harsh punishments such as death or life without parole will 
be excessive when imposed on an individual offender within one of 
these classes. In other words, there is a much greater likelihood that 
an extreme punishment will be excessive when it is applied to men-
tally retarded individuals or juveniles. Similarly, there is a much 
greater likelihood that these extreme punishments will be dispropor-
tionate when applied to strict liability crimes, or involve omissions 
rather than actions (such as failing to register as a sex offender). 
																																																																																																																																	
 9. Id. at 2458. 
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 The Court should therefore give less deference in these cases to 
the legislature’s implicit claim that the harsh punishment is not ex-
cessive, as that claim cuts against the general, contemporary under-
standing of the culpability of persons within these classes. In other 
words, the Court should impose stricter scrutiny when “suspect clas-
ses” are involved—suspect10  in the sense that we have reason to 
doubt the legislature’s implicit claim that legitimate penological aims 
necessitate the most severe punishments.11  
 This heightened scrutiny could take the form of a heavy burden on 
the legislature, in cases involving these suspect classes of offense or 
offender, to show that retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence re-
quire such harsh punishment. But when suspect categories are not 
involved—for example, if an adult with full capacity is sentenced to a 
term of years—the burden of showing excessiveness would be on the 
challenging party, with deference given to the legislature’s view that 
the punishment is proportional. 
 In Part II of this Article, I describe the Supreme Court’s standard 
model of Eighth Amendment analysis. My description includes a brief 
history of the development of the standard model, its application in 
influential cases, and its current doctrinal components—which I call 
“Objective Indicia Analysis” and “Individual Judgment Analysis.” 
Part III of the Article outlines the shortcomings of the standard mod-
el, focusing on the Court’s Objective Indicia Analysis and its concep-
tual relationship with the Individual Judgment Analysis. In Part IV 
of the Article, I address the relationship between evolving standards 
of decency and Objective Indicia Analysis through the lens of influen-
tial scholarship on constitutional interpretive theory, especially the 
work of Richard Fallon, Jack Balkin, and Mitch Berman. I argue that 
the evolving standards of decency principle differs in kind from Ob-
jective Indicia Analysis, and consequently that adherence to the for-
mer does not necessarily require application of the latter. I further 
argue that the evolving standards principle is consistent with a wide 
																																																																																																																																	
 10. There is precedent for treating some classes of punishment as constitutionally 
suspect, although not along the lines I propose here. For example, in Trop v. Dulles, Chief 
Justice Warren stated that: 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the 
dignity of man. While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending 
upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these 
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. 
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 11. Moreover, the basis for treating juvenile and mentally retarded offenders as a 
suspect category—their diminished capacity and moral culpability compared to fully com-
petent adults—is both a general principle of modern law and a view widely shared by and 
reflected in contemporary social standards. See the discussion of general legal attitudes 
towards mental retardation and juvenile status infra Part V. 
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range of interpretive theories, including all flavors of living constitu-
tionalism and many versions of originalism. 
 I address the Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Alabama in Part 
V. I point out that Justice Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, de-
clined to apply Objective Indicia Analysis. Justice Kagan’s opinion 
posits Miller as an exception to the methodological rule, but I argue 
that Miller signals the Court’s readiness to abandon Objective Indicia 
Analysis across all its Eighth Amendment decisions. 
 I argue in Part VI that the Court should abandon its Objective 
Indicia Analysis and replace it with strict scrutiny when confronted 
with suspect classes of offenses and offenders. I propose that juve-
niles and the mentally retarded should be treated as suspect classes 
of offenders, and that strict liability and omission offenses should be 
considered suspect classes of offenses. I show that the strict scrutiny 
approach implements the evolving standards interpretive principle, 
without collapsing into mere judicial fiat, by drawing on contempo-
rary understandings of the legitimate goals of punishment and of the 
lessened culpability of these offenders and for these offenses. I fur-
ther argue that the strict scrutiny approach avoids both the practical 
and theoretical pitfalls of Objective Indicia Analysis. 
II.   THE STANDARD MODEL OF INTERPRETATION 
 The Supreme Court’s approach to the Eighth Amendment is noto-
riously unclear and inconsistent.12 In a recent string of decisions, 
however, the Court appeared to have entrenched a standard ap-
proach to its Eighth Amendment cases—or at least to a subsection of 
them. In Graham v. Florida,13 Justice Kennedy divided the Court’s 
prior Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause jurisprudence cases in-
to general classes. The first class “involves challenges to the length of 
term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular 
case.”14 The cases in this class involve “a gross proportionality chal-
lenge to a particular defendant’s sentence.”15 The second set “com-
prises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality 
standard by certain categorical restrictions.”16  This Article focuses on 
the second set of cases, which implicate “a particular type of sentence 
																																																																																																																																	
 12. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using 
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1089 (2006) (“[T]he use of state legislation creates doctrinal chaos.”); Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005) (de-
scribing the Court’s approach to the Eighth Amendment as “ineffectual and incoherent”); 
Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 
475 (2005) (describing Eighth Amendment doctrine as a “mess”). 
 13. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 14. Id. at 2021. 
 15. Id. at 2022. 
 16. Id. at 2021. Prior to Graham, the categorical restriction cases had all involved the 
death penalty. Id at 2022. 
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as it applies to an entire class of offenders.”17 Justice Kennedy out-
lines the Court’s standard approach in these cases: 
 In the cases adopting categorical rules the Court has taken the 
following approach. The Court first considers “objective indicia of 
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and 
state practice” to determine whether there is a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice at issue. Next, guided by “the 
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s 
own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
text, history, meaning, and purpose,” the Court must determine in 
the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the pun-
ishment in question violates the Constitution.18 
 In other words, the Court’s standard approach involves two prongs 
of analysis: the Objective Indicia Analysis and the Independent 
Judgment Analysis. 
A.   Objective Indicia Analysis 
1.   The Development of Objective Indicia Analysis 
 The modern approach to interpreting the Eighth Amendment has 
its roots in Weems v. United States.19 The Court asserted that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “may be therefore progres-
sive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as 
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”20  Chief 
Justice Warren encapsulated this attitude in Trop v. Dulles by de-
claring that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”21 And Chief Justice Burger accepted this mode of interpreta-
tion in his dissenting opinion in Furman v. Georgia: 
For reasons unrelated to any change in intrinsic cruelty, the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited to those 
punishments thought excessively cruel and barbarous at the time 
of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. A punishment is inordi-
nately cruel, in the sense we must deal with it in these cases, 
chiefly as perceived by the society so characterizing it. The stand-
																																																																																																																																	
 17. Id. at 2015. 
 18. Id. at 2022 (citations omitted). 
 19. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that the punishment of cadena temporal, involving 
fifteen years hard and painful labor while bound at the wrist day and night as well as “in-
cidents” including permanent deprivation of the right to vote, to hold office, and to receive 
retirement pay, as well as the requirement to require written permission before any change 
in domicile after release, was disproportionate to the crime of falsifying public documents 
and was therefore cruel and unusual); see also Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Re-
thinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012) (argu-
ing that the punishment of “civil death” has surreptitiously reemerged in American law as 
a result of the network of collateral consequences of criminal conviction). 
 20. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378. 
 21. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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ard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily 
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, 
but its applicability must change as the basic mores of                 
society change.22 
 The notion that the scope of the Eighth Amendment “is not stat-
ic”23 has a great deal of appeal. There is little doubt that social atti-
tudes toward punishment have evolved substantially since the 
Eighth Amendment was adopted. Many of the punishment practices 
of the eighteenth century are now widely acknowledged as barbaric, 
to the extent that few judges or commentators are willing to insist 
that present applications of the Eighth Amendment must adhere to 
the penal attitudes of the framing generation. In the face of the fact 
that the Framers accepted “public lashing, or branding of the right 
hand,”24 for instance, even Justice Scalia’s originalism becomes faint 
of heart.25 
 The wide agreement that the Eighth Amendment should be un-
derstood through the prism of modern attitudes evaporates when it 
comes to identifying the content of contemporary civilized standards. 
Opinion has been sharply divided on the moral justifications of pun-
ishment, which can be roughly divided into the two camps of retribu-
tivism and consequentialism.26 And within each of these camps, there 
is no uniform view as to what punishment is allowed or required for a 
particular crime. For example, some retributivists believe that at 
least some murderers deserve death, and therefore that any punish-
ment short of death would be a grave injustice.27 On the other hand, 
other retributivists argue that no human being deserves to be put to 
death, no matter how terrible the crime committed.28 Similarly, con-
																																																																																																																																	
 22. 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger’s descrip-
tion of the Eighth Amendment as containing a static standard with dynamic application 
according to evolving standards is strikingly similar to Balkin’s conception of “framework 
originalism.” Framework originalism requires continued adherence to the original meaning 
of the Constitution’s “broad principles,” but the principles’ “specific applications would be 
left to future generations to work out.” BALKIN, supra note 4, at 26. 
 23. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 24. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). 
 25. Id. (“Even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally that [public lashing or brand-
ing of the right hand] were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, and even though no 
prior Supreme Court decision has specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any fed-
eral judge—even among the many who consider themselves originalists—would sustain 
them against an eighth amendment challenge.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 
194 (1982) (noting that historically there have been two competing approaches to justifying 
punishment, namely retribution and consequentialism). 
 27. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 156 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1970) (“There is no parallel between death 
and even the most miserable life, so that there is no equality of crime and retribution [with 
respect to murder] unless the perpetrator is judicially put to death.”). 
 28. See, e.g., STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?: THE IMMORALITY OF PUNISH-
ING BY DEATH 140 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that the death penalty is inconsistent with the 
retributive value of human desert, because “by renouncing the use of death as a punish-
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sequentialists disagree on whether the death penalty deters more 
murders than any lesser punishment, and therefore whether the 
death penalty is ever justified.29  
 Given the apparently intractable divergence of contemporary 
views about justified levels of punishment, there is a concern that 
judges, free from the constraints that the original scope of the Clause 
would provide, may impose their individual moral views under the 
guise of society’s evolved standards. As the Court noted in Gregg v. 
Georgia, “[c]aution is necessary lest this court become, ‘under the ae-
gis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbi-
ter of the standards of criminal responsibility . . . throughout          
the country.’ ”30  
 The risk that unelected Supreme Court Justices would impose 
their own personal moral values led the Court to declare the need for 
objective indicators of contemporary values about the infliction of 
punishment. The Court articulated this need in Furman v. Georgia, 
stating: 
 The question under [the evolving standards] principle, then, is 
whether there are objective indicators from which a court can con-
clude that contemporary society considers a severe punishment 
unacceptable. Accordingly, the judicial task is to review the history 
of a challenged punishment and to examine society’s present prac-
tices with respect to its use. Legislative authorization, of course, 
does not establish acceptance. The acceptability of a severe pun-
ishment is measured, not by its availability, for it might become so 
offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use.31 
 This passage from Furman not only establishes that the Court 
will look to objective indicia of contemporary social standards, but 
also identifies the two most important indicia. Because courts “are 
not designed to be a good reflex of democratic society,”32 the attitude 
of state legislatures and sentencers are better guides of social values 
than the subjective view of judges. The legislatures are the natural 
																																																																																																																																	
ment, we express and reaffirm our belief in the inalienable, unforfeitable core of human 
dignity”). 
 29. See, e.g., Louis P. Pojman, For the Death Penalty, in LOUIS P. POJMAN & JEFFREY 
REIMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY: FOR AND AGAINST 38 (1998) (“A consensus is wanting, so 
that at present we must conclude that we lack strong statistical evidence that capital pun-
ishment deters. . . . Precisely on the basis of this inconclusivity with regard to the evidence, 
some abolitionists . . . argue that deterrence cannot be the moral basis for capital punish-
ment. . . . I think [they] are wrong about this.”) 
 30. 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plu-
rality opinion)).  
 31. 408 U.S. 238, 278-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Four years later in Gregg v. 
Georgia, the Court reiterated that the assessment of contemporary values about punish-
ment “does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective 
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.” 428 U.S. at 173. 
 32. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)). 
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forum of democratic values; presumably, a law providing for a partic-
ular punishment would not be passed without community acceptance 
at the time. It may, however, later fall into disrepute without being 
repealed. If the punishment becomes offensive to developing social 
values, it may simply fall out of use despite being retained.33 The ac-
tions of sentencing judges and juries are therefore an important com-
plement to legislative enactments in determining social standards. 
2.   Legislative Enactments 
 In Furman, the Supreme Court referred to the extreme rarity with 
which the death penalty was imposed by sentencing juries34 but did 
not claim that the infrequency of imposition reflected a social consen-
sus against the death penalty. Rather, the Court held that the rarity 
of application, combined with a complete lack of guidance to the jury 
about which convicted murderers should be sentenced to death, 
meant that the death penalty in the form it was then administered 
was so arbitrary and capricious as to be cruel and unusual.35 Five 
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court held that the risk of arbi-
trary and capricious capital sentencing may be ameliorated by proce-
dural mechanisms, such as providing the jury with guidance on 
whether to impose the death penalty and bifurcating capital trials 
into separate guilt and sentencing phases.36 The Court relied on the 
enactment of such provisions in the wake of Furman not only as ne-
gating the claim that the death penalty was arbitrary and capricious, 
but also to as objective indicia that the death penalty was consistent 
with contemporary values: 
The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today re-
new the “standards of decency” argument, but developments dur-
ing the four years since Furman have undercut substantially the 
assumptions upon which their argument rested. Despite the con-
tinuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality 
and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that a large 
proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appro-
priate and necessary criminal sanction. 
The most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the 
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. 
The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes 
that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that re-
sult in the death of another person. And the Congress of the Unit-
																																																																																																																																	
 33. This is reflected in the description of nations that no longer practice the death 
penalty, but have not repealed it, as “de facto abolitionist” countries. See ROGER HOOD & 
CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 13 (4th ed. 2008) (de-
scribing countries as abolitionist de facto if there has been no execution for ten years, de-
spite the legal availability of the death penalty). 
 34. 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 35. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 36. 428 U.S. at 188-95 (plurality opinion). 
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ed States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing the death penalty 
for aircraft piracy that results in death.37 
 The fact that thirty-five state legislatures and the Federal Con-
gress had recently enacted legislation imposing the death penalty for 
at least some crimes suggested community endorsement of the death 
penalty. The Gregg court acknowledged that “[t]he jury also is a sig-
nificant and reliable objective index of contemporary values.”38 But 
this acknowledgement came with the caveat that 
the relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sen-
tence does not indicate rejection of capital punishment per se. Ra-
ther, the reluctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence 
may well reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of 
sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.39 
In other words, while the jury is a reliable objective barometer of con-
temporary values, the fact that juries rarely impose the death sen-
tence does not necessarily indicate that the death penalty is contrary 
to contemporary values. There is an alternative explanation for the 
low frequency of death sentences that is consistent with community 
endorsement of the death penalty, namely that juries (mirroring so-
ciety) believe the death penalty is appropriate for—and only for—the 
worst of the worst offenders. As we shall see in Part III, this amena-
bility of objective indicia to multiple explanations—some implying 
that a punishment is contrary to social standards, others consistent 
with community approval of the punishment—undercuts the role of 
objective indicia as determinative decisionmaking tools for the Court.  
 The Supreme Court relied more directly on Objective Indicia 
Analysis when it struck down the Georgia statute providing the 
death penalty for rape in Coker v. Georgia.40 The Court pointed       
out that 
if the “most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the 
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman,” it 
should also be a telling datum that the public judgment with re-
spect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punish-
ment for that crime, has been dramatically different.41  
In the wake of Furman’s invalidation of all the extant death penalty 
statutes, “only three [states] provided the death penalty for the rape 
of an adult woman in their revised statutes.”42 Two of those statutes 
made the death penalty for rape mandatory and were struck down in 
																																																																																																																																	
 37. Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted). 
 38. Id. at 181. 
 39. Id. at 182. 
 40. 433 U.S. 584, 595 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 41. Id. at 594 (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (plurality opinion)). 
 42. Id. (Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina). 
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Woodson v. North Carolina43 and Roberts v. Louisiana.44 That left 
Georgia as “the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present 
time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an 
adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital pun-
ishment when the victim is a child.”45 The Court concluded that while 
“[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is 
not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, . . . it obviously 
weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a 
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.” 46  The Coker Court 
found that jury sentencing practices also supported the inference of 
community prohibition on the death penalty for rape. More than nine 
out of ten Georgia juries declined to impose the death sentence        
for rape.47  
 Since Coker, the Court has engaged in Objective Indicia Analy-
sis—tallying the number of states that authorize the challenged pen-
																																																																																																																																	
 43. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that mandatory imposition of the death penalty vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment). 
 44. 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding that scheme which mandatorily imposed death pen-
alty for narrowly-defined categories of first-degree murder was unconstitutional, even 
though the scheme required jury instructions on manslaughter and second-degree murder 
in all cases). 
 45. Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (plurality opinion). The Court was not persuaded by the 
counterargument that 
11 of the 16 States that authorized death for rape in 1972 attempted to comply 
with Furman by enacting arguably mandatory death penalty legislation and 
that it is very likely that, aside from Louisiana and North Carolina, these 
States simply chose to eliminate rape as a capital offense rather than to require 
death for each and every instance of rape.  
Id. In other words, it is likely that state legislatures faced with Furman’s denunciation of 
unbridled jury discretion in death penalty cases—including the sixteen states that author-
ized the death penalty for rape—decided that compliance with the Eighth Amendment 
would be best achieved by eliminating jury discretion entirely; that is, by making the death 
penalty mandatory. But if the death penalty had to be mandatory, that meant that the only 
way to authorize the death penalty for rape was to require the death penalty for each and 
every instance of rape. So it is possible, perhaps even very likely, that these eleven states 
that chose not to include rape in their post-Furman death statute did so not because they 
rejected the appropriateness of the death penalty for rape but because they rejected the 
appropriateness of the mandatory death penalty for rape. On their understanding of Fur-
man, a discretionary statute that authorized the death penalty for the worst, but not all, 
rapes was off the table. Therefore, so the argument goes, the fact that they did not include 
rape in their new death penalty statute does not demonstrate that imposing death for any 
rape was repugnant to social standards. I am not proposing that this argument convincing-
ly demonstrates that the death penalty for rape was supported by a national social consen-
sus at the time Coker was decided. I am making the more modest, but nonetheless im-
portant, point that the objective indicia are murkier than a mere recitation of the number 
of states allowing a punishment might suggest. See infra Part III for further explication of 
this and similar lines of argument. 
 46. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (plurality opinion). 
 47. Id. at 597. In contrast to the Court’s comments in Gregg, the Coker Court seems 
not to have been swayed by Georgia’s argument that “as a practical matter juries simply 
reserve the extreme sanction for extreme cases of rape and that recent experience surely 
does not prove that jurors consider the death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment 
for every conceivable instance of rape, no matter how aggravated.” Id. 
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alty, determining the proclivity of juries to impose the punishment, 
and drawing inferences of underlying social norms—in numerous 
cases.48 The point of Objective Indicia Analysis, as it has developed, is 
to examine the relevant legislative and sentencing data and deter-
mine from them whether a societal or national consensus exists that 
the death penalty is disproportionate or excessive.49  
 What counts as a consensus has never been entirely clear. The 
standard usage of “consensus” suggests being in agreement or speak-
ing with one voice,50 but the Court has not translated this into a pre-
cise numerical requirement. As Coker demonstrates, unanimity is not 
required—indeed, a requirement of unanimity would be self-
defeating, as the fact that the punishment is being challenged means 
that at least one jurisdiction allows and implements it.51 One would 
expect that a national consensus would require, if not unanimity, 
more than a bare majority—and that, at the very least, a minority 
does not a consensus make. 
 A handful of illustrative examples are useful at this point. In 
Enmund, the Court held that there was a national consensus when 
thirty-three states did not authorize the death penalty for any unin-
																																																																																																																																	
 48. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (striking down mandato-
ry life without parole for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (strik-
ing down life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional for 
the offense of raping a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the 
death penalty is unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when applied 
to mentally retarded offenders); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (holding 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, imposed for possession of 672 
grams of cocaine, did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361, 380 (1989) (holding that the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338 (1989) 
(holding that there was not sufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing 
mentally retarded offenders, since the practice was only explicitly prohibited by statute in 
one state, and the petitioner did not offer any evidence of the general behavior of juries or 
prosecutors with respect to the sentencing of mentally retarded offenders); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988) (holding that the execution of an offender under the 
age of sixteen “is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community” and there-
fore violates the Eighth Amendment); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding 
that the death penalty is constitutional for felony murder, provided the offender was a 
major contributor to the felony, even if he did not have a specific intent to kill); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that executing an insane person violates the 
Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding the death pen-
alty unconstitutional for felony murder where the defendant participated in the felony but 
did not cause the death). 
 49. See, e.g., Tison, 481 U.S. at 147 (“This Court, citing the weight of legislative and 
community opinion, found a broad societal consensus, with which it agreed, that the death 
penalty was disproportional to the crime of robbery-felony murder” in the circumstances 
presented by Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786.). 
 50. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary online defines consensus as: “1. a : general 
agreement : unanimity; b : the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned; 2 : group 
solidarity in sentiment and belief.” Consensus Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consensus (last visited July 3, 2013).  
 51. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
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tended felony murder.52 The Court summarized the consensus in the 
following terms: 
While the current legislative judgment with respect to imposition 
of the death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt 
to take it, or intend to take life is neither “wholly unanimous 
among state legislatures,” nor as compelling as the legislative 
judgments considered in Coker, it nevertheless weighs on the side 
of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.53 
 In contrast, Penry v. Lynaugh held that there was not a national 
consensus against executing mentally retarded defendants at the 
time it was decided.54 In the Court’s view, “the two state statutes 
prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to 
the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do 
not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.”55 
 But thirteen years later, when the Court reconsidered the execu-
tion of mentally retarded defendants in Atkins v. Virginia,56 a further 
eighteen states and Congress had enacted prohibitions on any indi-
vidual with mental retardation from being sentenced to death.57 The 
Court declared that “the large number of States prohibiting the exe-
cution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of 
States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such exe-
cutions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views 
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal.”58 As Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent pointed out, 
the Court found a consensus against executing mentally retarded in-
																																																																																																																																	
 52. 458 U.S. at 792-93. Note that the simple statement of these figures hides some 
underlying issues about which states to count as contributing to the national consensus. 
The Court noted that eight states allowed the death penalty “to be imposed solely because 
the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was 
committed.” Id. at 792. Another nine states allowed the death penalty to be imposed for 
unintended felony murder when the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating fac-
tors—including, notably, “the defendant’s minimal participation in the murder.” Id. The 
Court suggested that it was unclear which number—eight or seventeen—represented the 
extent of disagreement with the death penalty for felony murder, but concluded that “even 
if” the larger number was used, “only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever 
permit a defendant who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be 
sentenced to die.” Id. It is worth pointing out, however, that seventeen states represents 
about half of the states that authorized the death penalty at all, which raises the question 
of how to characterize the non-death penalty states’ attitude towards capital felony murder. 
Should they be counted as against it, since they are against the death penalty generally, or 
should they be taken as not having a view, since they do not address it “directly,” so to 
speak? These issues are considered infra Part III.  
 53. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792-93 (citation omitted) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596). 
 54. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 55. Id. at 334. 
 56. 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002). 
 57. The states were Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, 
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 314-15. 
 58. Id. at 315-16. 
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dividuals “despite the fact that the laws of 19 other States besides 
Virginia continue to leave the question of proper punishment to the 
individuated consideration of sentencing judges or juries.”59 
 One interesting aspect of Atkins was the Court’s reference to the 
importance of a consistent trend in favor of prohibiting the relevant 
punishment practice. After reciting the states that prohibited execut-
ing mentally retarded defendants, Justice Stevens stated for the 
Court that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is sig-
nificant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”60 The Court 
also pointed to the significance of “the trend toward abolition of the 
juvenile death penalty” in Roper v. Simmons.61 In Roper, the Court 
was reconsidering whether the Eighth Amendment barred capital 
punishment for juveniles.62 The Court had previously held that there 
was not a national consensus against capital punishment for juve-
niles over the age of fifteen in Stanford v. Kentucky.63 The Roper 
Court pointed out that “[f]ive States that allowed the juvenile death 
penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 
15 years—four through legislative enactments and one through judi-
cial decision.”64 The Court, through Justice Kennedy, argued that 
“[t]hough less dramatic than the change from Penry to Atkins . . . we 
still consider the change from Stanford to this case to be signifi-
cant.”65 Pointing to the fact that “[s]ince Stanford, no state that pre-
viously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles ha[d] reinstated 
it,” Justice Kennedy concluded that “[a]ny difference between this 
case and Atkins with respect to the pace of abolition is thus counter-
balanced by the consistent direction of the change.”66 
 This opened up the possibility that a national consensus against 
(or for) a punishment could be found even when only a minority of 
states prohibited (or authorized) the punishment, provided there was 
a sufficiently consistent trend in one direction. The State of Louisi-
ana made precisely this argument in Kennedy v. Louisiana, relying 
on the fact that in the previous thirteen years, six states had made 
child rape a capital offense, whereas only five states had changed 
their position in the fifteen years between Stanford and Roper.67 Jus-
																																																																																																																																	
 59. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to say 
that “the Court’s assessment of the current legislative judgment regarding the execution of 
defendants like petitioner more resembles a post hoc rationalization for the majority’s sub-
jectively preferred result rather than any objective effort to ascertain the content of an 
evolving standard of decency.” Id. 
 60. Id. at 315 (majority opinion). 
 61. 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 555-56. 
 63. 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989). 
 64. 543 U.S. at 565. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 566. 
 67. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 432 (2008). The respondent had argued 
that the Court’s Objective Indicia Analysis should take into account another five states in 
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tice Kennedy again wrote for the Court and conceded that 
“[c]onsistent change might counterbalance an otherwise weak 
demonstration of consensus.”68  However, Justice Kennedy rejected 
Louisiana’s argument by distinguishing the total number of states at 
play in Roper from the number in Kennedy: 
Respondent argues the instant case is like Roper because, there, 
only five States had shifted their positions between 1989 and 2005, 
one less State than here. But in Roper, we emphasized that, 
though the pace of abolition was not as great as in Atkins, it was 
counterbalanced by the total number of states that had recognized 
the impropriety of executing juvenile offenders.69 
 Whether legislative enactments demonstrate a national consensus, 
then, depends on a combination of two factors: the total number of 
states that allow or prohibit the challenged punishment, and the ex-
tent to which there is a recent, consistent trend in the legis-           
lative enactments. 
3.   Sentencing Practices 
 While legislative enactments have provided most of the objective 
grist for the Court’s analytical mill, they are not the only data that 
the Court has relied on as reflecting community standards. The 
Court has also looked to the frequency with which available punish-
ments are actually imposed. The reluctance of sentencing bodies to 
impose a punishment may indicate that the punishment has fallen 
out of favor, despite still being legally available; conversely, the will-
ingness of sentencing bodies to frequently impose a punishment sug-
gests endorsement of that punishment by the community. 
 Graham v. Florida is perhaps the clearest example of the Court’s 
use of sentencing practices to find a national consensus against a 
punishment despite its widespread availability.70 In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life with-
																																																																																																																																	
which “legislation authorizing capital punishment for child rape is pending.” Id. at 431. 
The Court declined to do so, saying “[i]t is not our practice, nor is it sound, to find contem-
porary norms based upon state legislation that has been proposed but not yet enacted.” Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 432 (citation omitted). It is perhaps worth noting that the Roper Court (viz., 
Justice Kennedy himself) did not in fact emphasize that the slower pace of abolition was 
counterbalanced by the total number of states. In fact, as quoted above, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that the less dramatic pace of abolition was “counterbalanced by the consistent 
direction of the change.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added). The change in Kennedy 
was just as consistent as the change in Roper. Nonetheless, the total number of states in 
Roper and Kennedy is telling. In Roper, a total of thirty of the fifty states did not authorize 
the death penalty for juveniles: twelve states had rejected the death penalty altogether, 
and eighteen death penalty states had prohibited executing juvenile offenders. Id. at 564. 
In contrast, even after the “recent trend” leading up to Kennedy, only six states authorized 
capital punishment for child rape. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433.  
 70. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).  
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out parole for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.71 At 
the time, thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and federal 
law “permit[ted] sentences of life without parole for a juvenile offend-
er in some circumstances.”72 The Court reiterated that the “clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the 
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”73 But the Court re-
minded us that “[t]here are measures of consensus other than legisla-
tion,”74 the most important being “actual sentencing practices in ju-
risdictions where the sentence in question is permitted by statute.”75 
The data indicated that “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact im-
pose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offend-
ers—and most of those do so quite rarely—while 26 States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the Federal Government do not impose them 
despite apparent statutory authorization.”76 The rarity with which 
juvenile life without parole was imposed, especially against the back-
drop of the large number of cases in which the sentence could have 
been imposed,77 “disclose[d] a consensus against its use.”78  
 Not all sentencing practices are equally illustrative of community 
consensus, however. In the recent decision of Miller v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court declared that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
mandatory imposition of life without parole for juvenile offenders, 
including those convicted of nonhomicide offenses.79 As I will discuss 
in detail later, the Court did not rely on an analysis of the objective 
indicia to reach this conclusion, but it did declare that analysis of the 
objective indicia “does not preclude our [holding].”80 Life without pa-
role was an available—indeed, mandatory—punishment for some ju-
venile offenders in twenty-nine jurisdictions, but the Court argued 
that the actual sentencing practices in those jurisdictions were “unil-
luminating.”81 Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan pointed out the 
difference between Miller and Graham: 
																																																																																																																																	
 71. Id. at 2033. 
 72. Id. at 2023. 
 73. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
 74. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008)). 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. at 2024. The Court determined that “there are 123 juvenile nonhomicide of-
fenders serving life without parole sentences. A significant majority of these, 77 in total, 
are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are imprisoned in just 10 States—
California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, and Virginia.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 2025 (“Although it is not certain how many of these numerous juvenile of-
fenders were eligible for life without parole sentences, the comparison suggests that in 
proportion to the opportunities for its imposition, life without parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel 
and unusual.”). 
 78. Id. at 2023. 
 79. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 80. Id. at 2473. 
 81. Id. at 2472 n.11. 
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Here, we consider the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing 
schemes—which by definition remove a judge’s or jury’s discre-
tion—so no comparable gap between legislation and practice can 
exist. Rather than showing whether sentencers consider life with-
out parole for juvenile offenders appropriate, the numbers of juve-
niles serving this sentence merely reflects the number who have 
committed homicide in mandatory-sentencing jurisdictions.82 
 The Court was therefore able to conclude that mandatory juvenile 
life without parole violated society’s evolving standards of decency, 
even though a majority of states both authorized and imposed man-
datory juvenile life without parole.83 
B.   Independent Judgment Analysis 
 While the Court has engaged, on the one hand, in the complex 
analysis of objective indicia described above, it has also insisted that 
reliance on indicators of public opinion does not amount to the Court 
abrogating its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution. 84 
Hence the Court’s declaration in Gregg that “our cases also make 
clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to 
criminal sanctions are not conclusive”85 of whether the punishment 
being challenged violated the Constitution. In Coker v. Georgia, the 
Court made clear that this question was to be answered by the Jus-
tices applying their own independent judgment of the punishment 
practice, stating that “recent events evidencing the attitude of state 
legislatures and sentencing judges do not wholly determine this con-
troversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability 
of [the challenged punishment] under the Eighth Amendment.”86 
 The application of independent judgment has not always enjoyed 
the Court’s consensus. For example, Justice Scalia asserted in his 
plurality opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky that “[i]n determining what 
standards have ‘evolved,’ however, we have looked not to our own 
conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a 
whole.”87 After  determining that American society at that  time  did                    
                          
 
																																																																																																																																	
 82. Id. at 2471 n.10 (citation omitted).  
 83. Id. at 2459 (“In any event, the ‘objective indicia of society’s standards,’ that the 
States offer do not distinguish these cases from others holding that a sentencing practice 
violates the Eighth Amendment.” (citation omitted) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022)). 
 84. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (stating that “the task of 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (“This does not mean that judges have no role to play, for the Eighth 
Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power.”). 
 85. 428 U.S. at 173. 
 86. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
 87. 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). 
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not consider the challenged punishment (namely, juvenile capital 
punishment) to be indecent, Justice Scalia declared: 
The punishment is either “cruel and unusual” (i.e., society has set 
its face against it) or it is not. The audience for these arguments, 
in other words, is not this Court but the citizenry of the United 
States. It is they, not we, who must be persuaded. For as we stated 
earlier, our job is to identify the “evolving standards of decency”; to 
determine, not what they should be, but what they are. We have 
no power under the Eighth Amendment to substitute our belief in 
the scientific evidence for the society’s apparent skepticism. In 
short, we emphatically reject petitioner’s suggestion that the is-
sues in this case permit us to apply our “own informed judgment” 
regarding the desirability of permitting the death penalty for 
crimes by 16- and 17-year-olds.88 
 The plurality’s rejection in Stanford of Independent Judgment 
Analysis has itself since been repudiated. In Atkins v. Virginia, Jus-
tice Stevens’ majority opinion explained that “in cases involving a 
consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether 
there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizen-
ry and its legislators.”89  And when the Supreme Court reexamined 
the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons, it not only held that 
standards of decency had turned against the juvenile death penalty, 
it also reaffirmed the legitimacy of Independent Judgment Analysis: 
The [Atkins Court’s] inquiry into our society’s evolving stand-
ards of decency did not end there. The Atkins Court neither re-
peated nor relied upon the statement in Stanford that the Court’s 
independent judgment has no bearing on the acceptability of a par-
ticular punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, we re-
turned to the rule, established in decisions predating Stanford, 
that “the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of 
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”90 
. . . .  
. . . The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consen-
sus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures 
that have addressed the question. These data give us essential in-
struction. We then must determine, in the exercise of our own in-
																																																																																																																																	
 88. Id. at 378 (citation omitted). 
 89. 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (citation omitted) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597); see 
also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (confirming that the attitudes of state 
legislatures and sentencers do not wholly determine the acceptability of a punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
 90. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312). 
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dependent judgment, whether the death penalty is a dispropor-
tionate punishment for juveniles.91 
 That national consensus is not dispositive—that analysis of the 
objective indicia is accompanied by the Court applying its own objec-
tive judgment—has been reiterated by Kennedy and Graham, so that 
Individual Judgment Analysis is now an entrenched component of 
the Court’s standard approach. 92  In applying their independent 
judgment, the Justices are informed by “the Eighth Amendment’s 
text, history, meaning, and purpose.”93 This has usually involved the 
Justices addressing whether the challenged punishment is dispropor-
tionate or excessive in light of legitimate penological goals, primarily 
retribution and deterrence.94  
 For example, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court expressed its own 
judgment that the death penalty was an excessive punishment for 
felony murder because executing a person who did not intentionally 
kill was not justified by either retribution or deterrence. With respect 
to deterrence, the Court stated: 
We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death 
penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who 
does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken. 
Instead, it seems likely that “capital punishment can serve as a 
deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation         
and deliberation.”95 
 The Court’s judgment with respect to retribution was similar: 
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund’s criminal 
culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and 
his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and 
moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that 
he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing 
does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring 
that the criminal gets his just deserts.96 
 Since the challenged punishment did not contribute to either of 
the legitimate penological goals, it was “ ‘nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ and hence an 
																																																																																																																																	
 91. Id. at 564. Justice Scalia later responded to the resurrection of Individual Judg-
ment Analysis with the declaration that “[p]urer expression cannot be found of the princi-
ple of rule by judicial fiat.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 32, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 92. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407, 421, 427 (2008). 
 93. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
 94. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (observing that “[t]he death 
penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes by prospective offenders”). 
 95. 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 96. Id. at 801. 
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unconstitutional punishment.”97 In Enmund, it was the defendant’s 
lack of homicidal intent that made an extreme punishment (the 
death penalty) excessive for the purpose either of deterrence or retri-
bution. In other cases concerning mentally ill or juvenile offenders, it 
has been the defendant’s reduced mental and moral capacity that has 
reduced the extent to which severe punishment contributes to these 
legitimate penological goals. In Atkins, for example, the Court judged 
that “[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to jus-
tify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser cul-
pability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that 
form of retribution.”98 Nor would executing mentally retarded offend-
ers contribute to the goal of deterrence: 
[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make 
these defendants less morally culpable—for example, the dimin-
ished ability to understand and process information, to learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses—
that also make it less likely that they can process the information 
of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control 
their conduct based upon that information.99 
 When the Court struck down life without parole for juvenile non-
homicide offenders in Graham, the Court adjudged that characteris-
tics of both the class of offenders (juveniles) and the class of offenses 
(nonhomicides) meant that “when compared to an adult murderer, a 
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice dimin-
ished moral culpability.”100 The Court noted that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differ-
ences between juvenile and adult minds.”101 As a result of their lesser 
moral culpability and mental capacity, “none of the goals of penal 
sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, de-
terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provides an adequate 
justification” for imposing life without parole on juvenile non-
homicide offenders.102 
 It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court Justices’ in-
dependent judgment about these issues have diverged dramatically. 
Whether the imposition of severe punishments on mentally retarded 
and juvenile offenders is justified by legitimate penological goals, for 
instance, is a hotly contested issue on the Court. Justice Thomas’ dis-
sent in Graham asserts that the imposition of life without parole on 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders does serve legitimate goals—at a min-
																																																																																																																																	
 97. Id. at 798 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
 98. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 99. Id. at 320. 
 100. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 2026. 
 102. Id. at 2028 (citation omitted). 
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imum, the goals of incapacitation and deterrence.103 And whether the 
punishment is proportional in light of these goals is ultimately a 
moral question that cannot be definitively resolved by the sort of re-
search that the majority relies on.104 Justice Scalia made this point 
more emphatically in Stanford: 
According to petitioners, [the death penalty] fails to deter because 
juveniles, possessing less developed cognitive skills than adults, 
are less likely to fear death; and it fails to exact just retribution 
because juveniles, being less mature and responsible, are also less 
morally blameworthy. In support of these claims, petitioners and 
their supporting amici marshal an array of socioscientific evidence 
concerning the psychological and emotional development of 16- 
and 17-year-olds. 
     If such evidence could conclusively establish the entire lack of 
deterrent effect and moral responsibility, resort to the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause would be unnecessary; the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would invalidate 
these laws for lack of rational basis. But . . . it is not demonstrable 
that no 16-year-old is “adequately responsible” or significantly de-
terred. It is rational, even if mistaken, to think the contrary. The 
battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth Amendment; 
and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely 
scientific evidence is not an available weapon.105 
 In other words, no scientific evidence can conclusively prove that a 
particular punishment does not serve a legitimate penological goal. 
People may have differing, but nonetheless rational, judgments on 
the issue. So it is illegitimate for the Justices to impose their own 
views of proportionality in preference over the (reasonable) contrary 
views of elected legislatures.  To do so, argues Justice Scalia, “is to 
replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.”106 
C.   The Relationship Between Objective Indicia and                        
Independent Judgment 
 This brings us full circle. The concern Justice Scalia enunciates 
about judges imposing their subjective moral preferences is, of course, 
the justification for Objective Indicia Analysis. By employing both 
Objective Indicia Analysis and Independent Judgment Analysis, the 
Court is trying to balance competing concerns. Objective Indicia 
Analysis is meant to force the Court to apply society’s actual evolving 
standards rather than the Court’s own standards. But there is a wor-
																																																																																																																																	
 103. Id. at 2053 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 2056 (“The question of what acts are ‘deserving’ of what punishments is 
bound so tightly with questions of morality and social conditions as to make it, almost by 
definition, a question for legislative resolution.”). 
 105. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1989) (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. at 379. 
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ry that Objective Indicia Analysis alone “would largely return the 
task of defining the contours of Eighth Amendment protection to po-
litical majorities”107—while “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was 
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political contro-
versy.”108 So the Court also applies its own independent judgment—
independent of the judgment reflected in legislative enactments or 
sentencing behavior—about whether the challenged punishment is 
cruel and unusual. 
 But it is not at all clear how these two prongs of analysis fit to-
gether. The Supreme Court has said surprisingly little about the re-
lationship between them—whether they are weighed against each 
other, whether one form of analysis trumps the other, and if so why—
and what little the Court has said has been unhelpful and incon-
sistent. In earlier cases such as Coker v. Georgia and Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, the Court began its opinions by engaging its independent 
judgment, and then looked to the objective indicia to “confirm” its 
judgment.109 Later, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court described the role 
of its independent judgment as determining “whether there is reason 
to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and               
its legislators.”110 
 Most recently, in Kennedy and Graham, the Court explained its 
approach as beginning with analysis of the objective indicia followed 
by application of its independent judgment. 111  In both cases, the 
Court concluded that the challenged punishment was unconstitu-
tional “[b]ased both on consensus and our own independent judg-
ment.”112 This gives us little insight into the hierarchical relationship, 
if any, between the two modes of analysis. We know that if both the 
objective indicia and the Court’s independent judgment converge 
against applying the punishment, then the Court will conclude that 
the punishment is cruel and unusual. And presumably, if the Objec-
tive Indicia Analysis and Independent Judgment Analysis both con-
firm the punishment’s legitimacy, the Court will uphold the punish-
ment. But what about if the objective indicia and independent judg-
ment point in opposite directions? Does a national consensus of evolv-
ing standards trump the views of individual Justices, or does the 
																																																																																																																																	
 107. Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 109. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (explaining that the objec-
tive “indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a 
young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the 
ultimate penalty”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“Nevertheless, the legisla-
tive rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is 
that death is indeed a disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult    
woman.”). 
 110. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). 
 111. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 421 (2008). 
 112. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
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Court’s independent judgment about constitutional meaning have 
supremacy over the views expressed via other branches                   
of government? 
 The answers to these questions remain elusive. As it happens, the 
Court has never been forced to clarify the tension between the two 
prongs, for they have never led to divergent conclusions. In every 
case in which the Court has expressly relied on both Objective Indicia 
Analysis and Independent Judgment Analysis, the results of the two 
inquiries have converged.113 The same is true for the dissenting Jus-
tices who engage in both inquiries: the dissenting Justices’ analysis 
of the objective indicia of social standards in each case accords with 
their independent judgment.114 Apparently each Justice’s independ-
ent judgment has always accorded with (that Justice’s understanding 
																																																																																																																																	
 113. In fact, in every such case the Court has concluded that the Objective Indicia and 
Independent Judgment analyses have both supported striking down the challenged pun-
ishment practice. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407; Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker, 433 U.S. 584; see also 
Miller v. Alabama, 130 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 2471 (2012) (arguing that life without parole is 
an excessive punishment for juvenile offenders, “[b]ecause juveniles have diminished cul-
pability and greater prospects for reform,” and that while objective indicia are not relevant, 
“[i]n any event, the ‘objective indicia’ that the States offer do not distinguish these cases 
from others holding that a sentencing practice violates the Eighth Amendment”); Baze v. 
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 83 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 
485 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Stanford v. Kentucky, the majority found that the 
objective indicia did not establish a consensus against juvenile execution, but argued that 
the Court should not engage in a separate “proportionality” analysis. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
In fact, according to the Stanford Court, “the two methodologies blend into one another, 
since ‘proportionality’ analysis itself can only be conducted on the basis of the standards set 
by our own society; the only alternative, once again, would be our personal preferences.” Id. 
at 380. 
 114. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2048 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Neither objective 
evidence of national consensus nor the notions of culpability on which the Court’s ‘inde-
pendent judgment’ relies can justify the categorical rule it declares here.”); Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 587 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision today establishes a categorical rule 
forbidding the execution of any offender for any crime committed before his 18th birthday, 
no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense. Neither the objective evidence of 
contemporary societal values, nor the Court’s moral proportionality analysis, nor the two in 
tandem suffice to justify this ruling.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347, 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to “the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ ” against exe-
cuting mentally retarded offenders and pronouncing that no “principle of law, science, or 
logic” supports the Court’s conclusion that capital punishment is excessive for mentally 
retarded offenders); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 823, 826 n.42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that “[f]ar from ‘weighing very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a 
suitable penalty for’ felony murder, these legislative judgments indicate that our ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ still embrace capital punishment for this crime,” and concluding that 
the petitioner had not shown that “capital punishment is ineffective as a deterrent . . . [or 
did not] [serve] the admittedly legitimate goal of retribution” (quoting Coker, 443 U.S. at 
596)). Tonja Jacobi also made this observation regarding the Supreme Court’s decisions 
prior to 2006. Jacobi, supra note 12, at 1103 (“The Court has never explained what its con-
clusion would be if the various methodologies suggested conflicting conclusions. It has nev-
er had to. In each case, both the majority and dissents have always found that the national 
consensus confirms their proportionality, culpability and international law conclusions.” 
(footnote omitted)). What was true in 2006 is true today. The Court has kept its hitting 
streak alive through Kennedy, Graham, and Miller. 
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of) society’s judgment—even when that Justice’s independent judg-
ment conflicts with those of his or her brethren, and when that Jus-
tice’s interpretation of the objective indicia conflicts with the inter-
pretation of his or her colleagues. 
 We are entitled to be surprised that the Court’s independent 
judgment and society’s moral consensus simply coincide in every case. 
The consistent convergence of the two inquiries suggests an inference, 
namely that the Court’s determinations of social standards, purport-
edly based on objective indicia, are in reality informed by the Justices’ 
subjective moral views—which is, of course, the precise mischief that 
Objective Indicia Analysis is meant to avoid. 
III.   CRITICISMS OF THE STANDARD MODEL 
 The Supreme Court’s standard model of analysis has been sub-
jected to forceful criticism, both from some members of the Court it-
self and from other commentators. In the hope of providing some or-
der to my discussion, I shall divide the criticisms into several catego-
ries. I first address the practical problems associated with Objective 
Indicia Analysis—that is, the problems in its application. I then ad-
dress the more theoretical problems of Objective Indicia Analysis, by 
which I mean arguments that Objective Indicia Analysis would be 
constitutionally inappropriate even if there were no problems of ap-
plication. Third, I discuss criticisms of the Court’s Independent 
Judgment Analysis, and finally, I describe the additional problems 
that arise from the union of these two avenues of analysis. 
A.   Practical Problems of Objective Indicia Analysis 
 There are numerous difficulties with applying Objective Indicia 
Analysis in a particular case, most of which involve the vagueness 
and uncertainty regarding whether the “objective” factors indicate a 
national consensus against the challenged punishment practice. To 
be sure, all legal rules have a degree of uncertainty of application, 
and hence are underdetermined, but Objective Indicia Analysis, if not 
unique in kind, is extreme in the degree and multiplicity of the asso-
ciated vagueness. The analysis involves uncertainty across multiple 
dimensions, each of which magnifies the underdeterminacy (and, 
therefore, malleability) of the ultimate decision about whether the 
punishment violates evolving standards. 
1.   Defining the Universe of Objective Factors 
 The first dimension of uncertainty relates to deciding what we 
count in the objective indicia calculus, about how we define the uni-
verse of objective indicia. While legislation and jury sentencing have 
regularly been referred to as the best exemplars of community stand-
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ards, the Court has also flirted with the idea of including public opin-
ion polls115 and the attitudes expressed in foreign law.116 And even if 
we consider only legislation and sentencing practices in U.S. jurisdic-
tions, there is still significant disagreement as to what counts. In 
terms of legislation, there is dispute about whether all jurisdictions 
that allow (or prohibit) the challenged punishment should be includ-
ed, or only those jurisdictions whose legislatures have addressed the 
issue directly. So, for example, some Justices have argued that states 
that have abolished the death penalty entirely should not count for 
the purpose of determining whether there is a national consensus 
against a certain subset of capital punishment—such as whether 
there is a national consensus against executing mentally retarded or 
juvenile offenders. Because the legislatures in abolitionist states 
have not considered the precise question of whether to execute, spe-
cifically, mentally retarded or juvenile offenders, they cannot be said 
to reflect a separate community consensus against this practice.117 
Similarly, the Court in several cases excluded from its consensus cal-
culations many jurisdictions that required the mandatory imposition 
of life without parole for some juvenile offenders. In those jurisdic-
tions, the availability of juvenile life without parole was the product 
of the interaction between two separate statutory provisions: the pro-
vision by which allowed juveniles to be transferred into the adult 
criminal justice system, and the law imposing mandatory life without 
parole once in adult court. Justice Kagan explained this approach 
recently in Miller v. Alabama:  
Most jurisdictions authorized the death penalty or life without pa-
role for juveniles only through the combination of two independent 
statutory provisions. One allowed the transfer of certain juvenile 
offenders to adult court, while another (often in a far-removed part 
of the code) set out the penalties for any and all individuals tried 
there. We reasoned that in those circumstances, it was impossible 
to say whether a legislature had endorsed a given penalty for chil-
dren (or would do so if presented with the choice). In Thompson, 
we found that the statutes “t[old] us that the States consider 15-
year-olds to be old enough to be tried in criminal court for serious 
crimes (or too old to be dealt with effectively in juvenile court), but 
																																																																																																																																	
 115. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. 
 116. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31; Enmund, 458 U.S. 
at 796 n.22; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (plurality opinion). 
 117. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[w]ords have 
no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national 
consensus” (emphasis added)). The counterargument is that the greater necessarily in-
cludes the lesser: if the community considers the death penalty to be morally repugnant for 
any crime and any offender, then it necessarily considers the death penalty to be morally 
repugnant for a subset of those offenders. That is all that’s required for a national consen-
sus against the practice; there is no reason to require a distinct, additional prohibition (for 
independent reasons) against executing juveniles qua juveniles, or mentally retarded of-
fenders because of their mental retardation. 
2013]  STRICT SCRUTINY 879	
 
t[old] us nothing about the judgment these States have made re-
garding the appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders.” 
And Graham echoed that reasoning: Although the confluence of 
state laws “ma[de] life without parole possible for some juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders,” it did not “justify a judgment” that     
many States actually “intended to subject such offenders” to              
those sentences.118 
 These considerations demonstrated, according to Kagan, that 
“simply counting legislative enactments can present a distorted 
view”119 of whether there is a national consensus against a punish-
ment.120 Other Justices have argued that simply counting legislative 
enactments and ignoring pending legislation also presents a distorted 
view. Justice Alito, dissenting in Kennedy v. Louisiana, pointed to 
five states that had considered bills that would have authorized the 
death penalty for child rape. In his view, the absence of current capi-
tal child-rape laws in those states “cannot be viewed as evidence of a 
moral consensus against such punishment.”121 
 Justice Alito’s Kennedy dissent addresses another complication in 
determining which jurisdictions count in the tallying process. Evi-
dence of a relevant evolving community standard may be found, Jus-
tice Alito suggests, in legislation other than that which directly ad-
dresses the challenged punishment. For example, hardening atti-
tudes towards child sex offenders in general provide support for “a 
new evolutionary line”122 regarding capital child-rape laws: 
[R]eported instances of child abuse have increased dramatically; 
and there are many indications of growing alarm about the sexual 
abuse of children. In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registra-
tion Program, which requires States receiving certain federal 
funds to establish registration systems for convicted sex offenders 
and to notify the public about persons convicted of the sexual 
abuse of minors. All 50 States have now enacted such statutes. In 
addition, at least 21 States and the District of Columbia now have 
statutes permitting the involuntary commitment of sexual preda-
																																																																																																																																	
 118. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472-73 (2012) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 at 2025). 
 119. Id. at 2459. 
 120. See id. at 2473 (“That Alabama and Arkansas can count to 29 by including these 
possibly (or probably) inadvertent legislative outcomes does not preclude our determination 
that mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 121. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 459 (Alito, J., dissenting). While two of the 
legislative initiatives had failed by the time Kennedy was decided, Justice Alito argued that 
“there is no evidence of which I am aware that these legislative initiatives failed because 
the proposed laws were viewed as inconsistent with our society’s standards of decency. On 
the contrary, the available evidence suggests otherwise.” Id. at 458. 
 122. Id. at 456. 
880  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:853	
 
tors, and at least 12 States have enacted residency restrictions for 
sex offenders.123 
 These “changes in our society’s thinking since Coker was decid-
ed”124 are consistent with contemporary society believing that child 
rapists deserve harsher punishment than was believed appropriate 
thirty years earlier.125 
 Just as there is room for substantial dispute about which jurisdic-
tions should count in the tallying of legislation, so too is there room 
for disagreement with respect to the sentencing decisions of judges 
and juries. For example, the Court pointed out in Miller that one can 
hardly expect a low frequency of the imposition of life without parole 
on juveniles when the sentence is mandatory in some circumstanc-
es.126 Imposition of a mandatory punishment does not show that the 
sentencer morally endorses the punishment; rather, it shows the sen-
tencer had no choice but to impose the punishment, regardless of the 
sentencer’s moral views. One can make a similar argument about the 
frequency with which juries impose the death penalty in jurisdictions 
with “death-qualified” juries. When potential jurors who would refuse 
to impose the death penalty because they consider it immoral are 
routinely excluded from capital juries,127 it becomes difficult to argue 
that the willingness of these vetted juries to impose the death penalty 
demonstrates a moral consensus in support of capital punishment.128 
																																																																																																																																	
 123. Id. at 455-57 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). 
 124. Id. at 455. 
 125. Note that this is the converse of the position put forward by Justice Scalia that 
abolitionist states should not be included as objective indicia of a prohibition about sub-
species of the death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); supra text accompanying note 117. According to Justice Scalia, the fact that 
the legislature had declared a judgment against the death penalty in general did not indi-
cate a judgment against the death penalty as applied to mentally retarded or juvenile of-
fenders (despite this being a lesser included death penalty, as it were, with the general law 
applying to the particular punishment practice being challenged). But for Justice Alito, the 
general trend towards harsher treatment of child sex offenders is relevant to determining 
whether there is a consensus against capital child-rape laws—despite the fact that the new 
laws do not apply to the particular punishment practice being challenged. 
 126. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 n.10 (2012). 
 127. See, e.g., Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser 
Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 BYU 
L. REV. 519, 519-20 (2005) (“Prosecutorial preference for death-qualifying a jury—
preemptively removing potential jurors who ‘would automatically vote against the imposi-
tion of capital punishment’ or would otherwise be unable to perform their sentencing duties 
as jurors in a capital case—is well recognized among criminal law scholars and             
practitioners.”). 
 128. The Supreme Court ruled in Witherspoon v. Illinois that it is unconstitutional to 
disqualify jurors purely because they indicate opposition to the death penalty, because it 
would weaken the capacity of juries to reflect evolving social standards. 391 U.S. 510, 519-
20 (1968). The Court diluted this rule, however, in Adams v. Texas, allowing for disqualifi-
cation when a potential juror’s views on the death penalty “would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.” 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). 
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 Each of these disputes demonstrates the difficulty of even taking 
the first step in Objective Indicia Analysis. Simply deciding which 
things to count turns out to be not so simple. There is room for disa-
greement about whether to include opinion polls, foreign law, or even 
which domestic legislative and sentencing behavior to consider. With 
room for disagreement comes a need for individual judgment. The 
universe of “objective” factors turns out not to be very objective in the 
relevant sense—the relevant sense being, providing a basis for deci-
sionmaking external to and independent of the subjective preferences 
or value judgments of individual Justices. 
2.   How Many States Does a Consensus Make? 
 Putting aside the issue of which jurisdictions to include in the 
analysis, there is still the vexing question of how many jurisdictions 
are required to constitute a consensus. I discussed the amorphous 
nature of the concept of “consensus” in Part II, so I will be relatively 
brief here. The crux is that it is unclear at which point the scales tip 
over from a divided opinion, with a majority on one side unless opin-
ion is divided perfectly evenly, to a consensus against a certain pun-
ishment. The Court has applied a relatively capacious conception of 
“consensus,” especially in relatively recent cases. Indeed, one could 
argue that the Court has risked conflating “consensus” with “majori-
ty.” Such is the result suggested by Justice Kennedy’s finding in 
Kennedy that “[t]he evidence of a national consensus with respect to 
the death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, men-
tally retarded offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows di-
vided opinion but, on balance, an opinion against it.”129 To put this 
criticism another way, the Court has at times confused a lack of    
consensus in favor of a punishment with a consensus against                
the punishment. 
3.   The Commensurability Problem 
 Of course, as I conceded above, the mere fact that concept of con-
sensus has a penumbra of uncertain meaning130 is not, by itself, a 
reason to discard Objective Indicia Analysis. But the uncertainty of 
Objective Indicia Analysis is compounded by the fact that some of the 
factors may weigh more heavily in the analysis than others. That the 
federal government does not authorize a punishment may be strong-
er evidence of a national consensus than lack of authorization by a 
state, or even several states.131 But should a more populous state’s 
																																																																																																																																	
 129. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added). 
 130. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994). 
 131. It may also arguably be weaker evidence of a national consensus. See, e.g., Kenne-
dy, 554 U.S. at 459 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court notes that Congress has not enacted a 
law permitting a federal district court to impose the death penalty for the rape of a child, 
882  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:853	
 
view have more weight than a smaller state? And how do you com-
pare a case in which a large number of states allow a punishment but 
infrequently impose it, to a case in which a small number of states 
impose a punishment regularly? What counts as “infrequently” or 
“regularly” anyway? And should a state that has not imposed a pun-
ishment for ten years count more than a state that has not imposed it 
in five? Or has imposed it once in the same period? How should we 
count a state that retains the challenged punishment and imposes it 
occasionally, but for which polls routinely show strong opinion 
against the punishment? 
 Even when focusing solely on legislation, there is the possibility 
that some jurisdictions may have greater force in determining a na-
tional consensus. Express legislation prohibiting a punishment argu-
ably should weigh more heavily than lack of legislation authorizing 
the punishment. Furthermore, the Court has held that a legislative 
decision to prohibit a harsh punishment is especially telling, because 
of the general popularity of anti-crime legislation (and correlative 
unpopularity of legislation protecting offenders’ rights).132 Similarly, 
the Court has stated that “[t]he evidence carries even greater force 
when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue 
have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”133 
4.   Total States Versus Trends 
 Another way in which some legislation (and therefore, some juris-
dictions) can have more weight in the Objective Indicia Analysis re-
lates to how recently the legislative action occurred. As I discussed 
above, it is not only the total number of states for or against a pun-
ishment that matters. The Court has also considered a consistent 
trend towards abandoning a punishment practice as evidence of a 
nascent evolving standard that would prohibit the practice. And evi-
dence of a growing trend “might counterbalance an otherwise weak 
demonstration of consensus.”134 In both Roper and Atkins, the Court 
found that a (slim) majority of states had abandoned the death penal-
																																																																																																																																	
but due to the territorial limits of the relevant federal statutes, very few rape cases, not to 
mention child-rape cases, are prosecuted in federal court. Congress’ failure to enact a death 
penalty statute for this tiny set of cases is hardly evidence of Congress’ assessment of our 
society’s values.” (citations omitted)). 
 132. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005) (arguing that the fact that, 
since Stanford, no states had reinstated capital punishment for juveniles “carries special 
force in light of the general popularity of anticrime legislation”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002) (“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more 
popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large 
number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete 
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) 
provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as 
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”). 
 133. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
 134. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 431. 
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ty for juvenile and mentally retarded offenders respectively, and this 
majority position was supported by the fact there was a recent and 
consistent trend towards prohibiting the death penalty in these cir-
cumstances. In both those cases, then, both the total number of 
states and the “recent trend” cut in the same direction: towards aboli-
tion of the penalty, and therefore towards a social standard against 
the punishment practice. This combination of a majority of states and 
consistent trend convinced the Court that standards of decency were 
evolving towards a consensus against imposing the death penalty in 
the relevant circumstances. 
 In Kennedy on the other hand, according to the raw numbers, only 
a small minority of states authorized capital punishment for child-
rape offenders. But the legislation in each of these states was of re-
cent vintage: all six jurisdictions that authorized the death penalty 
for child rape135 had enacted the relevant law within the past twelve 
years, and three of those six had done so within two years.136 In the 
																																																																																																																																	
 135. The states that authorized the death penalty for child-rape in this period were 
Louisiana (1995), Montana (1997), Georgia (1999), Oklahoma (2006), South Carolina (2006), 
and Texas (2007). It is worth noting that Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas 
only authorized the death penalty if the offender had a prior rape conviction. Under Geor-
gia’s statute, child rape is a capital offense when aggravating circumstances are present; a 
prior rape conviction is one among many aggravating circumstances listed in the statute. 
Id. at 423. This raises the additional difficulty of how the Court should frame the relevant 
prevailing norm. It is at least arguable that the relevant norm relates to whether it is ap-
propriate to impose the death penalty on a child rapist for a first offense, rather than a 
repeat offense. One could argue that the explicit restriction of the death penalty to repeat 
offenders indicates the considered view that the death penalty should not be imposed on 
those defendants for whom this is the first sex offense. There is significant evidence to 
suggest a norm that a second sexual offense deserves substantially more punishment than 
a first offense. For example, twenty-four states have a statute that imposes more severe 
punishment on a second failure to register as a sex offender, with punishments including 
maximums of up to twenty years (Louisiana and Nebraska) and life (Georgia). Bradshaw v. 
State, 671 S.E.2d 485, 491-92 (Ga. 2008) (holding that the mandatory sentence of life im-
prisonment for a second violation of the sex offender registration law constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 136. It is also worth noting that the total number of jurisdictions should perhaps tally 
seven rather than six, since in 2006, Congress also passed a statute authorizing the impo-
sition of the death penalty for persons convicted of rape in courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 856 
(2006), amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, § 552(b), 119 
Stat. 3136, 3264. The existence of the death penalty for rape in the federal military code 
was not mentioned in any of the ten briefs filed in Kennedy. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice 
Dept. Admits Error in Not Briefing Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2008),  
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/us/03scotus.html?_r=0. Consequently, both Justice Kenne-
dy’s opinion for the Court and Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion included claims that the 
Congress had not authorized the death penalty for raping a child. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 
423; id. at 459 (Alito, J., dissenting). The oversight was first pointed out by civilian Air 
Force lawyer Dwight Sullivan three days after the decision was announced. Greenhouse, 
supra. The State of Louisiana and the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office requested a rehearing 
in the case. The Court denied the request, instead issuing new opinions with minor 
amendments acknowledging that the death penalty could be imposed for rape in military 
trials. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 459 n.6. Calling attention to military penalties raises 
an additional question of commensurability, to wit: How much does the existence of a pen-
alty under military law contribute to a national moral consensus—if at all—given that the 
penalty is not available under federal civilian law? 
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same period, no state had removed a law authorizing the death pen-
alty for child rape. Assuming for the sake of argument that states 
with pending legislation should not be considered, there is nonethe-
less a colorable argument for the existence of a consistent trend in 
support of allowing child-rapists to be executed. But in Kennedy, un-
like in Atkins and Roper, the recent trend and the total number of 
states in support of the punishment pulled in opposite directions. The 
Kennedy Court considered the trend data insufficient to overcome the 
weaker showing of a consensus in favor of the death for child-rape. 
Or perhaps it would be more conceptually accurate to say that the 
recent trend in favor of capital child-rape was insufficient to over-
come the indicia suggesting a national consensus against capital 
child rape. 
 In sum, then, applying Objective Indicia Analysis to particular 
cases involves many layers of vagueness, with each layer requiring 
another judgment call and magnifying the room for justices to (inten-
tionally or unintentionally) apply their own values regarding the 
punishment being challenged. The Court’s Objective Indicia Analysis 
is therefore a misnomer. I can think of no method for resolving these 
issues of uncertain application that could be described as “objective,” 
in the sense that it would prevent judges from imposing their own 
norms, or at the very least restrain them from too easily assuming 
that society in general shares their personal values.137 
B.   Theoretical Criticisms of Objective Indicia Analysis 
 In addition to the multi-vector vagueness of its application, the 
Court’s Objective Indicia Analysis has been subjected to more theo-
retical, or fundamental, critiques. These include the challenge that 
Objective Indicia Analysis rests on an illegitimate inference from leg-
islation to social values, that the Analysis is inconsistent with feder-
alism, and that the Analysis allows the scope of individual rights to 
be defined by the very majorities against which constitutional rights 
are supposed to protect. 
1.   The Inference from Legislation to Moral Standards 
 The belief that legislative enactments and sentencing practices 
are accurate barometers of prevailing social norms is at the core of 
the Court’s study when engaging in Objective Indicia Analysis. I ar-
gue that this belief is incorrect—that we cannot necessarily make an 
inference from the content of legislation (or sentencing practices) in a 
jurisdiction to the prevailing moral norms of the state’s people. This 
inference, I argue, is least warranted when drawn from the lack of 
																																																																																																																																	
 137. For other critiques of the indeterminacy of Objective Indicia Analysis, see Jacobi, 
supra note 12, at 1089 (arguing that using state legislation to establish a national consen-
sus “is so methodologically indeterminate as to be entirely subjective”). 
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legislation authorizing a punishment practice, since there will often 
be a multitude of alternative explanations for the lack of legislative 
authorization. That is, it requires little imagination to construct a 
scenario in which a state’s citizens support a punishment practice, 
but there is no legislation authorizing its use. 
 In fact, I argue that no imagination is required at all, for the cir-
cumstances of Kennedy v. Louisiana provide an evocative example of 
my point. In Kennedy, the Court inferred a national consensus 
against capital child-rape from the fact that it was not available in 
forty-five jurisdictions.138 But this assumes that the reason for the 
lack of legislation in each jurisdiction is a moral standard according 
to which it would be immoral or unjust to execute child rapists. We 
have enough information about at least some of these states, however, 
to seriously doubt that this is the case—and enough information to 
show that there was simply no causal connection between the content 
of legislation and community standards. 
 Consider Florida. The Florida legislature authorized the death 
penalty for child rape several decades ago, but the law was struck 
down as unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in Buford v. 
State.139 The Florida Supreme Court relied on the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Coker v. Georgia, which held that the death 
penalty was disproportionate to the rape of an adult woman and 
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.140 The Florida Supreme 
Court stated that the “reasoning of the justices in Coker v. Georgia 
compels” the conclusion that a death sentence is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the crime of child sexual assault and therefore prohibited 
by the federal Eighth Amendment.141 This holding, of course, accu-
rately predicted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision twenty-five years 
later in Kennedy. 
 The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida is not, however, a 
reflection of the prevailing norms in Florida about child sexual as-
sault and the death penalty. It does not purport to be. The moral 
norms of Floridians played no part in the Florida Supreme Court’s 
analysis. In fact, one could argue that the Florida Supreme Court 
struck down the legislation in accordance with the reasoning in Coker 
despite the fact that the prevailing norms in Florida permitted the 
death penalty for child rape—as indicated by the legislation authoriz-
ing the practice. The respondents in Kennedy made precisely this ar-
																																																																																																																																	
 138. Forty-four states plus federal law, at least in the civilian context. See Kennedy, 
554 U.S. at 423; supra text accompanying notes 135-36. 
 139. 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981). Despite this holding of unconstitutionality, the statute 
has not been amended. 
 140. Curiously, the victim in Coker was treated as an adult, despite being only sixteen 
years old, perhaps because she was married and had a child of her own. See Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 605 (1977). 
 141. Buford, 403 So. 2d at 951. 
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gument, claiming that Florida should be included “among those 
States that permit the death penalty for child rape”142 when evaluat-
ing the objective indicia of a national consensus.  Justice Kennedy 
failed to substantively address this specific claim, merely pointing 
out that “[d]efinitive resolution of state-law issues is for the States’ 
own courts, and there may be disagreement over the statistics.”143 
Despite these disagreements, Justice Kennedy asserted that the sta-
tistics “allow us to make certain comparisons with the data cited in 
the Atkins, Roper, and Enmund cases.”144 Given the relative numbers, 
one jurisdiction more or less would not affect the overall conclusions 
to be drawn from that comparison. 
 The claim that Florida should be included in the statistics, howev-
er, suggests an issue that extends beyond the inclusion of one state: 
it calls into question the Court’s general inference from an absence of 
legislation authorizing a penal practice to the existence of a prevail-
ing social or moral norm prohibiting the practice. The respondent ar-
gued that the Florida statute authorizing the death penalty for child 
rape was struck down as a result of the Florida Supreme Court’s ap-
plication of the reasoning in Coker, and not as a result of a prevailing 
norm prohibiting the execution of child rapists.145 A similar argument 
was made with respect to other states in which no law had been en-
acted authorizing the practice in question. Some state legislatures 
interpreted Coker as applying to the rape of a child as well as an 
adult woman.146 A belief in the unconstitutionality of such a law am-
ply explains the fact that legislation to that effect was never passed—
it would be both pointless (and costly) to enact legislation likely to be 
struck down, as well as a possible violation of the legislature’s duty of 
fidelity to the Constitution. Given an independent sufficient explana-
tion for the absence of the death penalty for child rape, it is inappro-
priate to infer a prevailing norm prohibiting the practice in         
those states. 
 Justice Kennedy’s response to this argument is sophistry at its 
best—which is to say, sophistry at its worst. First, Justice Kennedy 
points out that the Coker “opinion does not speak to the constitution-
ality of the death penalty for child rape, an issue not then before the 
Court.”147 To read Coker as declaring the execution of child rapists 
unconstitutional is to have “an erroneous understanding of this 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”148 The state legislatures, 
furthermore, had no excuse for making this mistake. The state courts, 
																																																																																																																																	
 142. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 424. 
 143. Id. at 425. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 428-31. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 428. 
 148. Id. at 426. 
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“to which the state legislators look for guidance on these matters . . . 
have been uniform in concluding that Coker did not address the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty for the crime of child rape.”149 
 While Justice Kennedy’s assertion about the rationale of Coker, 
and the conclusions of the state courts on the matter, may be true in 
a narrow and technical sense, it is both misleading and beside the 
point. The relevant issue is not whether Coker declared unconstitu-
tional the death penalty for child rape. The relevant issue is whether, 
as a result of the reasoning of Coker, state legislatures could or 
should have formed the belief that the Supreme Court would strike 
down any legislation they passed authorizing the death penalty for 
child rape. This is precisely the sort of predictive endeavor we would 
expect of a state legislature acting in good faith that is genuinely 
concerned with the constitutional restrictions that apply to the exer-
cise of state legislative power. It was entirely reasonable in the wake 
of Coker to predict that a law authorizing the death penalty for child 
rape would be held to violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. Buford is a case in point. Justice Ken-
nedy is correct, as far as it goes, that the Buford Court acknowledged 
that Coker only dealt with the crime of raping an adult woman. But 
the Buford Court also held that, more importantly, the reasoning 
enunciated in Coker compelled the conclusion that executing child rap-
ists was constitutionally disproportionate and excessive punishment. 150 
 Nor is Buford the only case in point: in Kennedy itself, the Su-
preme Court (at its first opportunity) struck down the death penalty 
for child rape, just as predicted by the Buford Court in Florida and by 
those state legislatures with an “erroneous understanding” of the Su-
preme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.151 There is a cer-
tain irony (to say the least) in describing as “unsound”152 a state legis-
lature’s belief that a child-rape death penalty statute would be struck 
down, in the very same opinion in which the Court strikes down the 
first child-rape death penalty statute to come before it.153  
																																																																																																																																	
 149. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy admitted that “[t]here is, to be sure, 
some contrary authority,” but nonetheless asserted that the courts have been uniform in 
their conclusions by dismissing the contrary authority as either dicta, or as the “decision of 
a state intermediate court that has been superseded by a more specific statement of the 
law by the State’s supreme court.” Id. at 430. 
 150. Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 1981). 
 151. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426. 
 152. Id. at 427. 
 153. It is worth keeping this point in mind when considering the ramifications of the 
Kennedy case itself. The Court frames its conclusion as requiring “adherence to a rule re-
serving its use, at this stage of evolving standards and in cases of crimes against individu-
als, for crimes that take the life of the victim.” Id. at 447. This indicates, quite strongly, 
that the Court would strike down any state legislation authorizing the death penalty for 
some crime against individuals, other than child rape, in which no one was killed. The only 
issue before the Court, however, was whether the death penalty could be constitutionally 
imposed upon a child rapist. The reference to a rule reserving its use for crimes that take 
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 Justice Kennedy supports his position on this issue by casting the 
argument about legislative motive as mere speculation: 
Respondent cites no reliable data to indicate that state legislatures 
have read Coker to bar capital punishment for child rape and, for 
this reason, have been deterred from passing applicable death 
penalty legislation. In the absence of evidence from those States 
where legislation has been proposed but not enacted we refuse to 
speculate about the motivations and concerns of particular        
state legislators.154  
 This is an important insight—but one that actually undercuts the 
methodology Justice Kennedy (and the Court) employs. In the ab-
sence of evidence, we should not simply presume that state legisla-
tures were motivated by particular concerns. We should not presume, 
for instance, that particular state legislatures would have authorized 
the death penalty for child rape but chose not to because they be-
lieved the legislation would be struck down. Yet this reasoning cuts 
both ways. We should similarly refrain from presuming that the ab-
sence of relevant legislation is the result of a prevailing moral norm 
prohibiting the execution of child rapists. 
 There are many factors that could explain the absence of legisla-
tion authorizing the death penalty for child rapists despite the ab-
sence of a prevailing norm to the effect that such a law would be dis-
proportionate and therefore unjust. A prediction that the legislation 
would be declared unconstitutional is only one explanatory factor, 
albeit a particularly plausible factor in this instance. Expanding the 
death penalty to include child rape may be considered too expensive. 
A small number of suitably placed representatives could stop a pro-
posed law in committee because it violated their moral norms (de-
spite being supported by a large majority of the state’s residents). 
The issue may be bitterly contested within the state, so that there is 
no consensus either for or against executing child rapists. Given 
these other plausible explanations for the absence of relevant laws, 
the Court is wrong to automatically infer from the absence of legisla-
tive authorization a prevailing norm prohibiting the death penalty 
for child rape. 
 In other words, when the Court draws inferences from the content 
of legislation to the existence of moral norms, that inference involves 
speculating about the motives and concerns of particular state legis-
lators. The enterprise of Objective Indicia Analysis rests, ultimately 
																																																																																																																																	
the life of the victim can therefore be construed as dicta. Should a well-intentioned legisla-
ture, facing an electorate demanding a non-fatal crime be punishable by death but desiring 
to comply with the Constitution, comply with this rule? 
 154. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). 
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and fundamentally, on this speculation. To borrow from Bentham, 
Objective Indicia Analysis is speculation upon stilts.155  
2.   The Objection from Federalism 
 The inherently speculative nature of Objective Indicia Analysis, 
and its consequent inability to accurately capture prevailing social 
norms, is not the only conceptual problem with the Court’s approach. 
Were this the only issue, we could resolve it by engaging a mecha-
nism that more accurately captured community moral standards. We 
could, for example, conduct careful and sophisticated surveys of peo-
ple’s attitudes about what punishments are permissible and about 
which punishments are proportional to what crimes.156 But I suspect 
that direct use of opinion poll data, no matter how sophisticated, 
would merely serve to increase criticism of the Court’s Objective In-
dicia Analysis. For even if legislative enactments and sentencing de-
cisions were an accurate mechanism for determining the prevailing 
majority (or consensus) sentiment, these sentiments are fundamen-
tally the wrong target. That is, the meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion should not turn upon the prevailing sentiments of contemporary 
opinion, whether measured directly or via legislative action and   
sentencing decisions. 
 One ground of criticism of the national consensus approach is that 
it is “contrary to basic notions of federalism.”157 Tonja Jacobi argues 
that the search for a national consensus undermines both the federal-
state balance and “horizontal federalism.”158 The federal-state bal-
ance is compromised because “the incorporation of a wholesale ban 
on a type of [punishment] in the U.S. Constitution eliminates the ca-
pacity of state regulation in this regard.”159 Horizontal federalism is 
affected by allowing the legislatures (or citizens) of some states to 
dictate the legislative capacity of other states.160 
																																																																																																																																	
 155. Jeremy Bentham, Nonsense Upon Stilts, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM, RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 317 (Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002). 
 156. For discussion of the use of empirical studies to determine moral norms, see gen-
erally Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe, Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cogni-
tive Science of Folk Intuitions, 41 NOÛS 663 (2007). For empirical work on moral intuitions 
and criminal law and sentencing, see, for example, Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2007). There have, of course, been a great many opinion polls about capital punishment. 
See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 12, at 1116-17 & nn.127-37 (citing state and national opinion 
polls about the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded offenders). Jacobi argues that 
“[t]his admittedly incomplete evidence suggests there may be a large consensus against the 
execution of both juveniles and the mentally retarded, even among states that do not have 
legislation that exempts those defendants.” Id. at 1117. 
 157. Jacobi, supra note 12, at 1089. 
 158. Id. at 1105 n.69 (“Horizontal federalism refers to the principle of the mutual inde-
pendence of institutions at the same level of government, particularly among states.”). 
 159. Id. at 1105. 
 160. See id. 
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 Jacobi argues that “the notion of constitutionally enshrining popu-
lar views in the form of judicial aggregation of a majority of states’ 
preferences” is contrary to the ideal that federalism protects against 
the tyranny of the majority.161 In fact, it may even allow for tyranny 
of the minority. To the extent that consensus requires more than a 
bare majority, a “minority bloc” of states is capable of “consistently 
defining the constitutional landscape for the remainder.”162 And ac-
cording to Jacobi, giving some states the power to take away legisla-
tive authority from other states is exacerbated by the fact that “con-
stitutionally enshrining a consensus creates an irreversible ratchet, 
which cannot be undone by future changes in state legislation.”163 
 I do not find the “irreversible ratchet” argument persuasive in this 
context. Imagine that, tomorrow, every state in the Union simultane-
ously enacted legislation explicitly endorsing some punishment prac-
tice. According to Objective Indicia Analysis, this would be objective 
evidence of a shift in attitudes; it would be evidence that there was 
now a national consensus in favor of the moral acceptability of the 
newly authorized punishment. There is nothing in the notion of look-
ing at legislative action or popular opinion that requires a one-way 
ratchet; the prevailing norms in the future need not be less severe 
than the currently prevailing norms.164  
 This rebuttal of the “irreversible ratchet” creates its own problems, 
however. Under the aegis of Objective Indicia Analysis, state legisla-
tures could not only curtail other states, they could also constitution-
ally endorse their own actions. At least in theory, by acting together, 
states could constitutionalize their enactments—with the constitu-
tional validity of those enactments ensured by the very fact of having 
been enacted by a sufficient number of states. 
3.   The Majoritarian Difficulty 
 Jacobi’s federalism argument applies mainly to the Court’s cur-
rent conception of Objective Indicia Analysis, which posits legislative 
enactments as the primary indicium of prevailing norms, and to a 
lesser extent, the alternative version of the approach in which norms 
are assessed on a state-by-state basis. But, as the “irreversible ratch-
																																																																																																																																	
 161. Id. at 1106. 
 162. Id. at 1111. Jacobi goes further and argues that a single state could restrict the 
legislative capacity of all other states since “at some point the addition of a state will con-
stitute the tipping point, at which a previously constitutional type of [punishment] is ren-
dered unconstitutional by the action of one additional state legislature.” Id. 
 163. Id. at 1106.  
 164. The term “evolving standards” is misleading in this regard. The word “evolving” 
evokes the idea that community standards are following a set or pre-ordained trajectory. I 
argue, however, that evolving standards are correctly understood as the changing stand-
ards that society accepts from time to time. It is conceptually possible that a “maturing” 
society could come to realize that maximizing legitimate penological goals requires harsher 
punishment than was previously realized. 
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et” discussion indicates, Jacobi’s federalism concerns are connected to 
the problem of tying the meaning of a constitutional right to the 
views of the public. John Stinneford reflects the concerns of several 
commentators165 by arguing that 
the evolving standards of decency test also suffers from a deeper 
theoretical problem, in that it appears to make the rights of crimi-
nal defendants dependent upon public opinion. Individual rights—
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech, for 
example—are typically thought to be necessary to protect unpopu-
lar individuals or groups when public opinion becomes enflamed 
against them. By contrast, the evolving standards of decency test 
only lets the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause come into 
play after public opinion has already turned in favor of, not 
against, criminal defendants. . . . 
 Because the evolving standards of decency test ties the mean-
ing of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to public opinion, 
the Eighth Amendment provides little protection when public opin-
ion becomes enflamed and more prone to cruelty.166 
 This is a powerful objection. Corinna Lain states the objection in 
even more powerful language than Stinneford: “Explicitly majoritari-
an doctrine shatters the conventional understanding of the Court as 
a countermajoritarian institution, challenges the theoretical under-
pinnings of judicial review, and casts the story of ‘Our Federalism’ in 
an entirely new light. It shakes the bedrock principle of consti-
tutional law.”167 
 If this challenge correctly portrays the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment, then the Amendment is self-
defeating. It merely prohibits the majority from imposing all pun-
ishments except those the majority approves of. The Court appears to 
																																																																																																																																	
 165. See Jacobi, supra note 12, at 1113 (“[D]eclaring an action unconstitutional because 
a significant number of states prohibit the practice leaves the Supreme Court enforcing 
constitutional protections only in cases where they are least needed.”); Susan Raeker-
Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court’s Evolv-
ing Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 556 (1996). 
 166. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment 
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
In support of the proposition that the Bill of Rights is typically understood as a protection 
against the tyranny of the majority, Stinneford cites, for example, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by 
the courts.”), and 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 982, at 697 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (“[A] bill of rights is an im-
portant protection against unjust and oppressive conduct on the part of the majority of the 
people themselves.”). 
 167. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 365, 369-70 (2009) (footnote omitted). Lain argues that majoritarian doctrine is not 
restricted to the Eighth Amendment, a position that I largely agree with except for two 
important caveats. I discuss those caveats below. 
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be trapped in a dilemma by the evolving standards of decency para-
digm. On the one hand, the Court cannot simply impose its own view 
about what punishment is appropriate, since the Court’s view may 
not align with the community’s prevailing norms. On the other hand, 
if the Court does apply the community’s prevailing norms, it neuters 
the Eighth Amendment by allowing the community to set its own 
standards of cruelty.168 
 But despite its force, this position involves a crucial error—a sub-
tle yet decisive mistake that previous commentators have failed to 
recognize. Critics such as Stinneford pose the majoritarian quandary 
as a “deeper theoretical problem” for the “evolving standards of de-
cency test.” 169 However, the problem actually lies with the Objective 
Indicia Analysis mechanism for identifying evolving standards, not 
with the evolving standards approach per se. The two are not identi-
cal; there is conceptual space between evolving standards and objec-
tive indicia. As I argue below, they are in fact different kinds of con-
stitutional rules. The evolving standards principle is an example of 
what Berman calls “constitutional operative propositions,” while Ob-
jective Indicia Analysis (indeed, the standard approach more general-
ly) is a “constitutional decision rule.”170 
 The mistake made by those who argue that the evolving standards 
of decency test allows public opinion to define defendants’ rights is to 
conflate evolving standards and objective indicia. Once we recognize 
the difference, and keep the two separate, it becomes clear that we 
can (and should) jettison Objective Indicia Analysis, but retain the 
principle that the Eighth Amendment should be understood in light 
of society’s evolving standards. I develop the argument for prying 
apart evolving standards of decency and Objective Indicia Analysis in 
Part IV of this Article. 
4.   Meaning Versus Expected Application 
 A further weakness of Objective Indicia Analysis is that it makes 
the mistake of equating meaning with expected application. The dis-
tinction between meaning and application has been used as a power-
ful critique of some schools of originalism (in which context, of course, 
the distinction is between original meaning and original expected ap-
																																																																																																																																	
 168. This dilemma is expressed (presumably inadvertently) in Gregg v. Georgia’s re-
quirements that the Court should “reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction,” but 
should not “become embroiled in the passions of the day.” 428 U.S. 153, 173, 175 (1976) 
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 169. Stinneford, supra note 166, at 1753 (emphasis added). 
 170. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004). Berman defines constitutional operative propositions as “essentially, judge-
interpreted constitutional meaning,” and defines constitutional decision rules as “rules that 
direct courts how to decide whether a given operative proposition has been, or will be, com-
plied with.” Id. at 51. 
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plication).171 I suggest that Objective Indicia Analysis involves a con-
temporary version of this mistake—that is, Objective Indicia Analy-
sis confuses current meaning with current expected application. 
 Some originalists, when arguing for a particular understanding of 
a piece of constitutional text, point to the way the text was originally 
applied as demonstrating what the text originally meant. As Balkin 
describes it, “[o]riginal expected application asks how people living at 
the time the text was adopted would have expected it would be ap-
plied using language in its ordinary sense (along with any legal 
terms of art).”172 But the expected result of applying a piece of text 
need not correlate with the meaning of the text. Ronald Dworkin ex-
plains the difference between meaning and expected application as 
follows: 
 This is the crucial distinction between what some official in-
tended to say in enacting the language they used, and what they 
intended—or expected, or hoped—would be the consequence of 
their saying it. Suppose a boss tells his manager (without winking) 
to hire the most qualified applicant for a new job. The boss might 
think it obvious that his own son, who is an applicant, is the most 
qualified; indeed he might not have given the instruction unless he 
was confident that the manager would think so too. Nevertheless, 
what the boss said, and intended to say, was that the most quali-
fied applicant should be hired, and if the manager thought some 
other applicant better qualified, but hired the boss’s son to save his 
own job, he would not be following the standard the boss had in-
tended to lay down.173 
 Similarly, when we attempt to discern the original intended mean-
ing of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, or any other con-
stitutional text, we should not be “limited to those applications spe-
cifically intended or expected by the framers and adopters of the con-
stitutional text.”174 Instead, the meaning of the text is found in the 
concepts and underlying principles embodied in the text. 
 When the Supreme Court looks to objective indicia in an attempt 
to determine the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment, the 
Court is actually considering the current expected application of the 
Eighth Amendment. It is looking at data about what society thinks 
about the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, and consequently, 
what society expects should be the result of applying the Eighth 
Amendment. But the majority of society could be wrong about the 
																																																																																																																																	
 171. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 116-17 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (distinguishing between semantic 
originalism and expectations originalism); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 
24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295-97 (2007). 
 172. Balkin, supra note 171, at 296. 
 173. Dworkin, supra note 171, at 116-17. 
 174. Balkin, supra note 171, at 295. 
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meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The core concept—the mean-
ing—of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that punish-
ment ought not be excessive. We should not presume that what 
members of society consider to be excessive (or not) is automatically so. 
C.   Criticisms of the Union of Objective Indicia Analysis and          
Independent Judgment Analysis 
 Before delving fully into the project of differentiating evolving 
standards and objective indicia, one other fundamental problem with 
the Court’s standard model of determining categorical Eighth 
Amendment cases must be mentioned. As I outlined in Part II, the 
standard model comprises both Objective Indicia Analysis and Inde-
pendent Judgment Analysis. The Court has insisted that Objective 
Indicia Analysis is not dispositive. Depending on which case you read, 
either objective indicia are used to confirm the Court’s independent 
judgment about the challenged punishment, or the Court applies its 
independent judgment to determine whether there is reason to de-
part from the national consensus. 
 But if the objective indicia of national consensus is not disposi-
tive—if the Court can depart from the objectively determined prevail-
ing norms whenever, in its own independent judgment, there is rea-
son to do so—then it is unclear how the Objective Indicia Analysis 
provides a meaningful constraint on independent, subjective judicial 
morals. The Court’s application of its independent judgment negates 
the raison d’être of Objective Indicia Analysis. 
IV.   SEPARATING EVOLVING STANDARDS FROM                                          
OBJECTIVE INDICIA ANALYSIS 
 To understand the non-identical relationship between evolving 
standards and objective indicia, let us return to the beginning. The 
basic principle by which the Supreme Court interprets the Eighth 
Amendment is, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”175 The primary original justifications for this principle were 
that “the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their 
scope is not static.”176 
 The Eighth Amendment is not, of course, the only portion of the 
U.S. Constitution that fits the description of having imprecise lan-
guage and dynamic scope. It is a commonplace that much of the Con-
stitution, especially those sections that protect individual rights, con-
sists of broad language and often appeals to moral concepts. Nor is 
the Eighth Amendment the sole subject of the exhortation that the 
																																																																																																																																	
 175. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 176. Id. at 100-01. 
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Constitution’s meaning should be determined according to contempo-
rary attitudes and understandings, rather than by reference to the 
attitudes and understandings of the framing generation. This claim 
is nothing more than a denial of originalism—in fact, it is something 
less. It is a denial of a subset of originalism, in which both the mean-
ing and application of constitutional provisions are set at the time 
the provisions are adopted. It rules out only the flavor of originalism 
that Balkin and others call “original expected application.”177 Under-
stood as such, it is clear that the evolving standards principle is not 
unique to the Eighth Amendment. It is, rather, a ubiquitous (though 
disputed) principle of constitutional interpretation.178 
 We can see the unexceptional nature of the evolving standards 
approach by comparing the Court’s comments about how the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted with statements by the Court 
about other constitutional provisions. Chief Justice Burger stated 
that the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause varied 
not because the concept of cruelty changed, but because society’s per-
ceptions of cruelty evolved. In other words, “[t]he standard itself re-
mains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores 
of society change.”179 To take one example for comparison, this is 
strikingly similar to Chief Justice Sutherland’s declaration, in the 
context of the Constitutional rights to liberty and property, that 
“while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the 
																																																																																																																																	
 177. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
 178. Lain makes a similar claim in her excellent article, The Unexceptionalism of 
“Evolving Standards,” supra note 167, at 368-69. But Lain’s claim is different from mine—
and, I believe, mistaken—in two important respects. First, Lain makes the same mistake 
as Stinneford in conflating evolving standards and objective indicia. Lain claims to be 
demonstrating the unexceptionalism of the former, but actually addresses the unexcep-
tionalism of the latter. She argues that 
death penalty scholars routinely assume that the sort of state nose-counting 
that the Supreme Court does under the “evolving standards” doctrine does not 
occur elsewhere. In the larger academy, too, the reigning assumption is that 
explicitly majoritarian doctrine is an exclusively Eighth Amendment affair—an 
approach limited to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the death 
penalty cases that dominate this corner of constitutional law. 
Id. at 367-68. The state nose-counting to which Lain refers is Objective Indicia Analysis, 
and not the evolving standards approach per se. This is not to say that Lain’s actual con-
clusion—that Objective Indicia Analysis is applied outside the Eighth Amendment—is 
wrong. Lain marshals a compelling case for the unexceptionalism of Objective Indicia 
Analysis. But I am arguing that the evolving standards principle is a much broader general 
principle of constitutional interpretation than its objective indicia gloss. And therefore, I 
argue that evolving standards is far more ubiquitous than Lain suggests. My second quib-
ble with Lain relates to the defense (or purported defense) of the Court’s majoritarian 
Eighth Amendment doctrine. Lain says that “the leading defense of the ‘evolving standards’ 
doctrine” is the word “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment’s text. Id. at 367 n.5, 369 n.10. 
But I argue that the Court has also justified its evolving standards approach either by 
reference to the term “cruel” and, more importantly, to the concept of proportionality de-
rived from the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a whole. 
 179. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new 
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field 
of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should 
be otherwise.”180 
 Similarly, we can get a sense of the ubiquity of the general evolv-
ing standards approach through a simple word replacement exercise. 
I would be surprised if any of the advocates of applying evolving 
standards to the Eighth Amendment would be troubled by the follow-
ing sentiment: “The Equal Protection Clause must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” In this context, the decency at issue would relate 
to equal treatment rather than punishment, but in either case, the 
notion invoked is that of evolving moral norms. 
 The Equal Protection Clause parallel is useful in another im-
portant way: it demonstrates that the evolving standards approach 
does not necessarily entail Objective Indicia Analysis. Those who en-
dorse the idea that the Equal Protection Clause should be understood 
in light of evolving moral standards of equal dignity do not insist that 
the Court should locate those standards in the quantity of state legis-
lative and executive action. We would think it strange in the extreme, 
I suggest, were the Court to simply count the number of states that 
prohibited, for instance, interracial marriage and determine the con-
stitutional valence of the practice by reference to its prevalence. 
 The solution—or at least the key to the solution—to interpreting 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause can be found in this con-
trast with the Equal Protection Clause. The Court determines equal 
protection issues not tallying jurisdictions for or against a practice, 
but by applying different “tiers of scrutiny” to different classes of leg-
islative distinctions. The Court applies strict scrutiny to laws that 
distinguish on the basis of suspect categories (paradigmatically 
race),181 intermediate scrutiny to classes such as gender,182 and ra-
tional basis review to other, non-suspect classifications.183 The tiers of 
scrutiny doctrine reflects contemporary moral values—evolving 
standards of decency—to the extent that the Court is informed by 
contemporary values in determining which classes of individuals de-
serve heightened review.  
 
																																																																																																																																	
 180. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
 181. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719 (3d ed. 2009) (“Discrimination 
based on race and national origin is subjected to strict scrutiny. Also, generally, discrimi-
nation against aliens is subjected to strict scrutiny, although there are several exceptions.”). 
 182. Id. (“Intermediate scrutiny is used for discrimination based on gender and for 
discrimination against non-marital children.”). 
 183. Id. at 720 (“All laws not subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny are evaluated 
under the rational basis test.”). 
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V.  TIERS OF SCRUTINY UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
 The Court should apply a tiers-of-scrutiny approach to the Eighth 
Amendment that mirrors its method for determining issues of equal 
protection. Society’s evolving standards should be located in the gen-
eral principles of crime, culpability, and punishment, rather than 
state legislation regarding the particular punishment practice in 
question. In certain classes of crimes, punishments, or criminals 
where we have reason to be skeptical that the punishment is propor-
tional to the crime (the heart of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition), 
the Court would apply strict scrutiny to the class in question. Exam-
ples of the classes of circumstances in which strict scrutiny would 
apply include where the punishment is absolute and incapable of be-
ing calibrated to the particular offense or offender (such as the death 
penalty and life without parole), where the defendant has diminished 
capacities and therefore presumptively diminished culpability (such 
as minors and the mentally ill), and where the crime is one in which 
the traditional culpability does not apply (such as strict liability of-
fenses, and offenses of omission such as failure to register as a       
sex offender). 
 The Court should give up its present practice of searching for 
norms specific to the case at hand, such as executing the mentally 
retarded or imposing life prison terms for failure to register as a sex 
offender. The Court should rather focus on tracking the evolution of 
the broader concepts associated with our understanding of cruel and 
unusual. These broader concepts can provide guidance to the Court 
beyond the individual values of its constituent Justices, while avoid-
ing the peculiar paradox of determining the constitutional validity of 
democratically enacted legislation by reference to majority opinion. 
The principles can lay claim to being more than merely the idiosyn-
cratic opinion of individual Justices. Few would argue, for example, 
that in general, juveniles and mentally retarded individuals have di-
minished capacity to conform their actions to the dictates of criminal 
law and diminished ability to understand (and potentially be de-
terred by) the punitive consequences of their behavior. It is also rela-
tively uncontroversial that as a general matter, these characteristics 
result in lesser moral culpability on the part of most juveniles184 and 
																																																																																																																																	
 184. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 76-80 (1998) (describ-
ing the generally accepted characteristics of juvenile development that may render youth 
less culpable than adults for the same behavior, including the lack of fully developed cogni-
tive abilities and a lower capacity to control impulsiveness); Barry C. Feld, Competence, 
Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adoles-
cents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 542 (2003) (“As a matter of crime policy, youths’ develop-
mentally diminished responsibility and limited adjudicative competence render them less 
culpable than adult offenders; as a matter of youth policy, adolescence is a period of rapid 
growth and transition, and youths are ‘works in progress’ who have not yet become the 
people they will be as adults.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 
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mentally retarded individuals.185 These notions are reflected in the 
differences in treatment of these classes of offenders under the crim-
inal justice system. Similarly, the law treats certain categories of of-
fenses as generally involving lesser culpability. This is reflected in 
the Court’s refusal to allow the death penalty to be imposed for a 
crime other than homicide;186 death is different as a crime as well as 
a punishment. Other examples of offense categories which are rou-
tinely accepted as involving less moral culpability are strict liability 
offenses,187 and offenses of omission rather than commission.188 
 The disagreement arises, inter alia, with respect to whether there 
is ever a justification to apply a particular punishment to members of 
these groups. Individual juveniles, for instance, may have developed 
sufficiently to have capacities and culpabilities on par with adults. 
And even if juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, and those who 
commit crimes of omission are usually accepted as having lesser 
																																																																																																																																	
81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 825 (2003) (noting that society views young actors as less culpable 
than adult criminals because of their unformed and evolving moral character). 
 185. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 420 (1985) (attributing reform of the criminal justice system’s 
treatment of mentally retarded offenders to a more general movement toward fuller recog-
nition of the rights of retarded people in all areas of American law); Lyn Entzeroth, Consti-
tutional Prohibition on the Execution of the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 
TULSA L. REV. 299, 307 (2002) (noting that the common law has recognized for centuries 
that mental retardation is an attribute that may affect an individual’s capacity to be held 
liable for criminal conduct or correspondingly be subjected to criminal punishment); Case 
Comment, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2565, 2570 (2003) (noting that mental 
health research “has unquestionably contributed to the existing consensus regarding the 
suitability of execution for the mentally retarded: many of the current state bans adopt 
medical definitions of mental retardation nearly word for word”). 
 186. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 187. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1994) (“In a system that generally 
requires a ‘vicious will’ to establish a crime, imposing severe punishments for offenses that 
require no mens rea would seem incongruous.” (citation omitted)); Alan C. Michaels, Con-
stitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 841 (1999) (explaining the mitigating princi-
ple of “constitutional innocence,” under which criminal punishment must be predicated on 
some independent culpability with regard to offense elements in order for the legislature to 
have the power to punish); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1076-78 (1997) (arguing that strict liability is a genuine 
problem for retributive theory when it punishes morally blameless conduct); John Shepard 
Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpre-
tation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1105 (1999) (noting that the analysis of the Staples court sug-
gested that mandatory culpability should be limited as to serious crimes but not for       
petty crimes). 
 188. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Crea-
tion, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 385 (2008) (“Anglo-American criminal law generally has 
not criminalized omissions. Perhaps because of the deontological constraint against appro-
priating the bodies and labor of some to reduce the risks faced by others, and perhaps as 
well because of the difficulties in administrability, affirmative acts are rarely mandated by 
the criminal law.”); Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2009) 
(“The prospect of liability for ‘inchoate omissions’—involving no act and no harm—exists at 
the frontier of the state's authority to criminalize conduct and, whether allowed or rejected, 
effectively determines the outer boundaries of that authority.”); Graham Hughes, Criminal 
Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958) (noting that “our criminal law in its progress has only 
occasionally and almost reluctantly admitted the offense of omission within its scope”). 
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moral culpability than others similarly situated, this does not neces-
sarily mean that none of the legitimate penological goals will be sat-
isfied by punishing them—perhaps even by punishing them harshly. 
Reasonable people can—and do—disagree about whether a certain 
level of punishment advances penological goals sufficiently to justify 
the imposition of that punishment, instead of a less harsh alternative. 
 The Court’s Independent Judgment Analysis fails because of this 
reasonable disagreement. Individual Justices differ on whether there 
is reason to believe that the death penalty or life without parole suf-
ficiently advance penological goals, either in general or as applied to 
classes of offenses or offenders. Similarly, when there is room for 
such disagreement, there is an argument to be made that the Court 
should defer to the (putatively reasonable) position taken by the state 
whose legislation is being challenged. The problem, of course, is that 
the possibility of reasonable disagreement—especially about moral 
issues—is so all-encompassing189 that the logical end-point is univer-
sal deference to the legislature, resulting in the Eighth Amendment 
becoming a dead letter. 
 My alternative is that the Court should vary the degree of defer-
ence it provides to legislatures depending on the class of offenders 
and offenses. It is generally accepted that the most severe punish-
ments—capital punishment and life-without-parole, both of which 
are final and absolute in their own way—are only appropriate and 
proportional to a small minority of the most culpable offenders.190 So 
when a legislature authorizes one of these punishments for a catego-
ry of offenders usually considered to be less culpable than the aver-
age offender, the Court has reason to be skeptical of the legislature’s 
implicit claim that the punishment satisfies proportionality. The leg-
islature in these circumstances loses the benefit of deference; it loses 
the presumption on the part of the Court that the punishment suffi-
ciently satisfies legitimate penological goals. On the other hand, 
when a punishment does not apply to a suspect class—that is, a class 
for which we have reason to be skeptical that the most extreme sanc-
tions will be proportional—then deference to the legislative judgment 
is appropriate. This is especially the case when the punishment in-
volves a term of years sentence; there is room for reasonable disa-
greement about how to calibrate the precise number of years that is 
proportional to a given offense. 
 Heightened scrutiny could therefore take the form of placing on 
the state the burden of demonstrating that the harsh punishment—
the death penalty or life without parole191—is necessary to satisfy  
																																																																																																																																	
 189. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
 190. Proportionality requires that the worst offenses should be treated most severely, 
and that lesser crimes should be treated less severely, and so on. 
 191. Note that there are some similarities between this approach and the Court’s no-
tion that death is different. I am drawing the line (on the punishment side) at life without 
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legitimate penological goals. When heightened scrutiny does not ap-
ply, the state would merely have to show a rational basis for believ-
ing that the punishment is proportional or not excessive—that there 
is a rational basis for believing that the punishment practice advanc-
es legitimate penological goals. Given the extent to which these is-
sues are in dispute, the level of scrutiny that the Court applies is 
likely to be decisive in most cases—but that should come as no      
surprise to anyone familiar with tiered review in other consti-              
tutional contexts. 
VI.   ABANDONING OBJECTIVE INDICIA 
 Not surprisingly, commentary on the cases handed down by the 
Supreme Courts at the end of its 2011 Term has centered on Nation-
al Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,192 in which the 
Court substantially upheld the federal Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act. But with so much attention focused on Sebelius, 
there is a risk that the significance of Miller v. Alabama could be lost 
in the kerfuffle. Three days prior to Sebelius, the Court decided Mil-
ler v. Alabama, holding that mandatory life without parole for juve-
niles violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unu-
sual punishment. 193  I argue that despite being narrowly framed,    
Miller indicates a fundamental shift in the Court’s Eighth       
Amendment methodology. 
 Justice Kagan’s opinion posits Miller as an exception to the meth-
odological rule, but I argue that Miller signals that the Court is 
poised to abandon Objective Indicia Analysis across all its Eighth 
Amendment decisions.  
A.   The Miller Decision 
 In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life without parole for 
juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.194 Justice Kagan, 
writing for the Court, reiterated the requirement that cruel and unu-
sual be understood in light of evolving social standards of decency. 
But she eschewed the use of objective indicia to determine current 
social standards. Rather, Justice Kagan’s opinion asserted that “the 
																																																																																																																																	
parole, which happens to track the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment in Gra-
ham and Miller. I am also taking into account categories of offenses and offenders. This has 
some parallel in the Court’s death penalty doctrine (the line between homicide and non-
homicide for instance) and also resonates with Justice Kagan’s attitude towards the Eighth 
Amendment, as demonstrated by her Miller opinion. As Justice Kagan pointed out, “if (as 
Harmelin recognized) ‘death is different,’ children are different too. Indeed, it is the odd 
legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children. In that context, it is no 
surprise that the law relating to society’s harshest punishments recognizes such a distinc-
tion.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
 192. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 193. 132 S. Ct. 2455. 
 194. Id. 
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confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion” 
that such sentences are unconstitutional.195 The first line of prece-
dent involves categorical bans on a particular punishment for a class 
of offenders, the most recent and relevant of which is Graham’s ban 
on life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. The second 
line of precedent consists of those cases prohibiting mandatory impo-
sition of capital punishment, beginning with Woodson v. North Caro-
lina.196 From the former set of cases, Justice Kagan elicits the princi-
ple that life without parole is to juveniles as the death penalty is to 
adult offenders;197 from the latter line of cases, she draws the demand 
for “individualized sentencing” when imposing the death penalty.198 
The syllogistic combination of these two principles leads to the 
Court’s conclusion that imposition of life without parole on a juvenile 
requires consideration of individual factors, including, most im-
portantly, the youth of the offender and the effect that has on his or 
her culpability.199 
 Perhaps the most striking aspect of Miller is Justice Kagan’s as-
sertion that Objective Indicia Analysis is inapposite in this case. She 
argues that Miller and its companion case “are different from the typ-
ical one in which we have tallied legislative enactments.”200 The typi-
cal tallying case, Justice Kagan claims, involves a categorical bar 
against imposing a penalty on a class of offenders or offense, whereas 
Miller “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before 
imposing a particular penalty.”201 
 By adopting this position, Justice Kagan avoids justifying her po-
sition by reference to the number of states that subject juveniles to 
mandatory life without parole; she only refers to the data to refute 
the State’s claim that the objective indicia support upholding the 
punishment.202 But she does not explicitly declare that Objective In-
dicia Analysis will no longer be employed in other types of Eighth 
Amendment cases, most notably “categorical bar” cases. There are, 
however, several reasons that suggest the Court will—and should—




 195. Id. at 2458. 
 196. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 197. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 198. Id. at 2468. 
 199. Id. at 2465-66. 
 200. Id. at 2471. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (“In any event, the ‘objective indicia’ that the States offer do not distinguish 
these cases from others holding that a sentencing practice violates the Eighth         
Amendment.”). 
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B.   The Methodological Implications of Miller 
 Despite Justice Kagan’s framing of Miller as addressing only the 
mandatory imposition of juvenile life without parole, there are strong 
indications that the Court will forsake Objective Indicia Analysis in a 
broader range of cases, including those involving a “categorical bar.” 
 The Court’s recent history demonstrates a steady accretion in the 
Eighth Amendment’s reach. When the Court has imposed a bar on 
punishment, it has framed its holding narrowly, carefully distin-
guishing the set of practices to which the ban applies from the broad-
er set of practices not affected by the holding. But when the Court 
has later been confronted with a punishment of the kind distin-
guished in a prior case, it has routinely construed the prior decision 
as not ruling that only the punishments banned by the prior holding 
are cruel and unusual. Justice Kagan’s treatment of Graham is a 
case in point. She acknowledges that “Graham’s flat ban on life with-
out parole applied only to nonhomicide crimes, and the Court took 
care to distinguish those offenses from murder, based on both moral 
culpability and consequential harm.”203 But she argues that none of 
what Graham said about child offenders—“about their distinctive 
(and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities”—is 
limited to nonhomicide.204 These factors apply equally to juveniles 
convicted of homicide. Despite Graham’s holding being expressly lim-
ited to juvenile nonhomicide cases, the reasons that undergird Gra-
ham’s rationale also support a ban encompassing juvenile             
homicide offenders. 
 We can expect a similar fate for Miller. While the Miller Court 
limited its methodology to “process” cases, and expressly distin-
guished “categorical bar” cases, this line is unlikely to remain. First, 
Justice Kagan’s argument distinguishing Miller from the Objective 
Indicia Analysis cases is unconvincing. As we have discussed, Justice 
Kagan argues that Miller is different from the typical Objective Indi-
cia Analysis case because Miller involves prohibiting a process—
mandatory imposition of a punishment—rather than a category of 
punishments. But Justice Kagan’s opinion ignores the fact that the 
paradigmatic process case, Woodson v. North Carolina, itself employs 
Objective Indicia Analysis.205 And none of the cases following Wood-
son suggest that Objective Indicia Analysis is inapplicable to deter-
																																																																																																																																	
 203. Id. at 2465. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (“Central to the applica-
tion of the Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards regarding the inflic-
tion of punishment. As discussed in Gregg v. Georgia, indicia of societal values identified in 
prior opinions include history and traditional usage, legislative enactments, and jury de-
terminations.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 
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mining the constitutionality of mandatory punishments.206 In other 
words, there is no doctrinal reason to apply a different methodology 
in “process” cases; the force of prior mandatory sentencing cases is 
quite to the contrary. 
 Furthermore, Justice Kagan’s distinction between “categorical bar” 
and “process” cases is fundamentally different from the distinction 
employed in earlier cases in which the “standard model” was outlined. 
Recall that when Justice Kennedy outlined the Court’s two-step ap-
proach to “categorical bar” cases in Graham, he distinguished “cate-
gorical bar” cases not from “process” cases, but rather cases in which 
the Court considers the proportionality of an individual’s sentence 
“given all the circumstances of a particular case.”207 
 In addition, the rationale for whether to apply Objective Indicia 
Analysis applies equally to both “process” and “categorical bar” cases. 
The Court’s opinion in Miller affirms that the meaning of cruel and 
unusual is always determined in light of evolving standards of decen-
cy; the evolving standards lens applies both to substantive categories 
of punishment, and to the processes by which punishments are im-
posed those described as procedural—including mandatory imposi-
tion, such as in Miller itself. (The Court has never suggested, for in-
stance, that whether the death penalty may be imposed is deter-
mined by current social mores—but whether it can be mandatory is 
determined by the original understanding of cruel and unusual.) In 
other words, whether mandatory juvenile life without parole is cruel 
and unusual depends on contemporary standards of decency. But the 
justification for Objective Indicia Analysis is that it provides a ba-
rometer of current standards of decency, based on factors independ-
ent of the Justices’ individual moral preferences. It is far from self-
evident, however, why the Court would require this objective guid-
ance to determine whether a category of punishment accords with 
current standards, but does not need objective data to determine con-
temporary social views about the permissibility of punishment pro-
cesses. Given the retention of the evolving standards interpretive 
principle, it makes little sense to reject Objective Indicia Analysis in 
“process” cases, but continue to employ it in “categorical bar” cases. 
 In combination, these two factors—the trend of extending the 
Eighth Amendment’s application, and the weakness of justifications 
for cabining Miller’s methodology to “process” challenges—suggest 
that the Court is likely to follow Miller in declining to employ Objec-
																																																																																																																																	
 206. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (striking down a mandatory 
death penalty for murder committed while serving life without parole); Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that state courts must consider difficult upbringing as 
a mitigating circumstance when determining whether to impose the death penalty); Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (invalidating death penalty statute for not permitting the 
requisite individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances). 
 207. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
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tive Indicia Analysis, and that ultimately, the methodology will be 
abandoned entirely. 
C.   The Affinity Between Miller and “Tiers of Scrutiny” 
 If the Supreme Court is moving to abandon Objective Indicia 
Analysis, the pressing question is: what methodology will take its 
place? The Court’s Miller opinion does not provide a complete an-
swer; the essence of the Court’s reasoning is simply that the result in 
Miller flows inevitably from the confluence of the two lines of prece-
dent discussed above. The Miller opinion does, however, contain some 
hints as to how the Court will assess whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual in cases that the Court cannot claim are so directly con-
trolled by precedent. I argue that those hints indicate that the 
Court’s evolving attitude towards the Eighth Amendment has much 
in common with the “tiers of scrutiny” approach. 
 The Miller Court endorses the view that the central concept of the 
Eighth Amendment is that punishment must be not be excessive, but 
instead must be proportional to the offender and the offense.208 A 
punishment is excessive if it goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the legitimate penological goals of punishment, such as retri-
bution, deterrence, and incapacitation.209 But it is incredibly difficult 
to calibrate the precise level of punishment that is required (or al-
lowed) by these justifications for a given offense or offender, and 
there is room for people to reasonably disagree.210  The individual 
judgment portions of the Justices’ opinions, which essentially consist 
of that Justice’s judgment about whether a punishment is justified by 
legitimate penological goals, reflect this disagreement—hence the 
recourse to Objective Indicia Analysis.  Because this analysis is nei-
ther objective nor indicative of social standards, we need an alterna-
tive decision rule to resolve reasonable disagreement. 
 The Court’s opinion in Miller suggests a different way to resolve 
the issue. Justice Kagan writes that “[b]y making youth (and all that 
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sen-
tence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate pun-
ishment.”211 This claim reflects the notion that, for some sets of pun-
ishments and offenders, we have specific reasons to be suspicious 
that the punishment will be disproportionate in an individual case—
just as we have reason to suspect in Equal Protection analysis that 
distinctions based on race or gender are illegitimate. In the Eighth 
Amendment context, one such set is juvenile offenders, who as a class 
																																																																																																																																	
 208. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 209. See, e.g., id. at 2465-66. 
 210. This is especially true of cases involving a term of years, which is one reason why 
the Supreme Court has shown great deference to legislative determinations that a pun-
ishment of a term of years is proportional for a given offense. See discussion supra Part V.  
 211. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (emphasis added). 
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lack the mental capacity of adults. As a result, “the distinctive at-
tributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing 
the harshest sentences on juvenile[s].”212 We therefore have reason to 
be suspicious of a legislative determination that a harsh punishment 
is proportional for juvenile offenders. Moreover, the basis for treating 
juvenile offenders as a suspect category—their diminished capacity 
and moral culpability compared to adults—is both a general principle 
of modern law, and a view widely shared by and reflected in contem-
porary social standards. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 By holding that mandatory life without parole is cruel and unusu-
al punishment, Miller continues the Supreme Court’s gradual expan-
sion of the Eighth Amendment over the past ten years. But it does so 
by departing from the Court’s now-familiar methodology. Unlike its 
predecessors, Miller does not rely on objective indicia of evolving 
standards of decency to support its holding. The Court’s opinion pur-
ports to distinguish Miller from earlier cases involving objective indi-
cia, but this distinction will not last long. The Court, led in this 
sphere by Justice Kagan, is moving towards abandoning objective 
indicia as a mechanism for applying the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause. Justice Kagan has not yet set forth a fully developed 
alternative methodology, but her Miller opinion demonstrates a con-
cern that there is an unacceptable risk that severe punishments, 
such as death or life without parole will be disproportionate when 
applied to members of classes usually treated as less culpable. The 
suspect classes approach I outline in this Article provides a frame-
work to fill the methodological vacuum that will soon result from Mil-
ler. According to this approach, the Court would apply heightened 
scrutiny when considering a category of crime or offender that con-
temporary society and the modern legal system generally regard as 
involving less moral culpability. This approach not only reflects 
evolved standards of decency, but also provides a mechanism for de-
ciding Eighth Amendment cases even though reasonable persons 
may differ about whether the punishment at issue is excessive. In 
doing so, the suspect classes approach allows the Court to escape the 
dilemma—of either allowing majority opinion or personal judicial 
values to dictate constitutional meaning—that manifest in the 
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